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Abstract 
 
This work aims at shedding some light on public and private roles in biopharmaceutical 
innovation. After reviewing the pillars of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technical 
change, we analyse current innovation policy devices; among them, we focus on the patent 
system. As suggested by historical and empirical literature, the effectiveness of patents in 
spurring innovation is all but uncontroversial. Real-world technical change, in fact, results 
from the interaction of heterogeneous actors belonging to complex “innovation systems”. In 
this context, typical of the biopharmaceutical industry, the role of the government is likely to 
be decisive and invisible at the same time, hidden by a tight network of licensing and 
technological transfer agreements. In order to unveil the public hand, we propose a patent 
analysis aimed at identifying the value and the characteristics of public and private 
biopharmaceutical innovation. The analysis is conducted over two datasets: the first one 
collects patents from the USPTO Cross-Related Art References 514.810-935 granted between 
1976 and 2006; the second one was built by Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) and includes all 
patents associated to New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) from 1988 to 2005. We find that public and academic patents result in 
greater knowledge externalities as measured by forward patent citations. Furthermore, public 
and academic patents are on average more original and more general than their private 
counterparts. However, these results hold only for the first dataset, suggesting that a better-
rounded vision of biopharmaceutical innovation dynamics may be achieved only through a 
microscopic approach, investigating the characteristics of public and private R&D over different 
therapeutic areas and at different levels of the innovation chain.   
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Introduction 
“Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν φησι διὰ τὸ χεῖρας  
ἔχειν φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον.”1 
Aristotle, c. 350 B.C. 
 
Adam and Alfred, hand in hand 
 
“Metaphors are not to be trifled with. A single metaphor can give birth to love.”2 When Milan 
Kundera wrote these words to narrate about the noblest human feelings, he would have 
probably never predicted them to be used as an incipit of an economic paper. However, 
economists – while being proud to deal with “the lower elements of human nature”3 – have 
actually often indulged in the pleasure of creating metaphors.4  
 
Adam Smith himself, the father of modern economic science, was the author of one of the 
most successful metaphors ever.  
 
“As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value […]. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By 
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his 
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may 
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. […] By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”5 
                                                 
1 “Anaxagoras says that man is the most intelligent of animals because he has hands”. Aristotle, Περὶ ζῴων 
μορίων, IV, 10, 687a, 7. 
2 Kundera, M. (1984). The Unbearable Lightness of Being. 
3 Edgeworth (1881), p. 52. 
4 “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either 
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.” Aristotle, 
Poetics, 1457b. For a seminal contribution on economics’ rhetoric and on the role of metaphors in the history of 
economic thought, see McCloskey (1983). See also: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/05/economic_metaphors 
5 Smith (1776), IV, 2.9. 
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So powerful was the representation of free markets as an ethereal, metaphysical welfare-
maximizing device, that the “invisible hand” metaphor quickly became central in the 
economic debate. In fact, when - in 1977 - Alfred Chandler engaged in the investigation of 
American capitalism’s characteristics, he named his work “The Visible Hand”. 
 
“Modern business enterprise took the place of market mechanisms in 
coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its resources. In many 
sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced what Adam Smith 
referred to as the invisible hand of market forces.”6 
 
In contrast to Smith, who ascribed the resource allocation task to the independent action of a 
myriad of self-interested individuals, Chandler (1977) saw in the much more concrete large 
corporations’ managerial class the ultimate engine of the U.S. economy.7   
 
Both the Smithian and the Chandlerian intellectual ventures aimed at identifying the 
determinants of economic welfare and growth. Nowadays, in the era of knowledge economies, 
the ability to innovate - i.e. to create new knowledge – is easily recognizable as a nation’s most 
precious asset. The enquiry into the nature and causes of innovation thus becomes pivotal. Is 
innovation originated by the invisible hand of free market competition, or is it the result of the 
big multinational corporations’ visible handwork? In this work we argue that, for once, tertium 
datur. A third hand may be involved in spurring technical change in our economies: the one of 
the government. Differently from Smith’s invisible and Chandler’s distinctly visible hands, 
however, this third one may be harder to discern.  
 
In 2001, when the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked by Senator Ron Wyden to 
investigate the contribution of the National Institute of Health (NIH) to the development of 
the blockbuster anti-cancer drug Taxol, it found that the NIH had invested in total $484 
million. Of the $9 billion revenues earned in the period 1993-2002 by Bristol Myers Squibb 
(BMS) – the U.S. based company that, through a so called Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement (CRADA)8, had obtained the right to commercialize the final drug – 
the NIH had received royalties for $35 million. Meanwhile, Medicare had purchased Taxol for 
                                                 
6 Chandler (1977), p. 1. 
7 See Langlois (2003) for a review of the historical development of Chandler’s theory in economics.  
8 The CARDAs, introduced under the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act are cooperative R&D agreements 
between a U.S. government agency and a private company to work jointly on a certain technology. See 
http://www.research.va.gov/programs/tech_transfer/crada/ 
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$687 million.9 In fact, Taxol was marketed at $1,000 for therapeutic cycle (1993 price): many 
U.S. taxpayers, who had indirectly funded its development, were probably unable to afford it. 
The GAO concluded that “in light of the significant federal investment, questions remain(ed) 
regarding the extent to which NIH used its broad authority in its negotiations with BMS on 
the royalty payments and the price of the drug to obtain the best value for the government.”10 
According to Angell (2006), similar cases occurred for several other blockbuster drugs, such as 
Glivec and Epogen.  
 
Stories such as Taxol’s suggest that, although being decisive, the public hand is not always 
visible. The U.S. biopharmaceutical sector - both because of its peculiar features and its 
immediate link with human life (and death) - offers a privileged angle to assess the scope and 
the characteristics of public and private contributions to technical change. In a field where 
slower accessible to innovation involves worse health, identifying the ultimate responsibles of 
new drugs’ development acquires paramount importance.  
Workplan 
 
Our ultimate goal here is to assess the role and characteristics of public and private 
biopharmaceutical innovation.  
 
As shown in the following pages, however, this is a challenging task, both theoretically and 
empirically. Chapter 1 recalls the main theories of technical change, from the neoclassical 
market failure framework – justifying government intervention on the basis of knowledge 
characteristics - to the more recent evolutionary approach – looking at innovation as an 
imperfect process of knowledge accumulation. Notwithstanding the lively academic debate, 
we show that no theoretical convergence has ever occurred around the determinants and the 
dynamics of innovation. Consequently, the validity of current innovation policies is easily 
questionable. In particular, Chapter 2 focuses on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) - the 
most widely used incentive to innovate - and shows that, far from being a theoretically sound 
and neutral instrument, IPRs are the result of a long and convoluted institutional process. If, 
as it seems, real-world innovation works differently from its neoclassical representation, IPRs 
and patents in particular – based on the standard theory of market failure - may thus be 
                                                 
9 GAO (2003). 
10 GAO (2003), p. 20. 
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ineffective and even detrimental in promoting the creation and accumulation of new 
knowledge.  
 
With regard to the biopharmaceutical market, this already complex scenario assumes an even 
more problematic shape. In fact, because of its institutional and economic characteristics, the 
industry has been often regarded as the emblem of the great potential of innovation and, 
simultaneously, of current innovation policies’ dysfunctionality. After reviewing the main 
specificities of the biopharmaceutical industry, Chapter 3 shows that in recent years, driven by 
the “biotech revolution”, biopharmaceutical innovation systems have assumed a new shape, 
with a number of public, academic and non-public actors interacting in a tight network of 
formal and informal agreements. According to Block (2011), however, the federal government 
would still be the first-mover of the whole biopharmaceutical innovation engine.     
 
In this context, assessing the respective roles of public and private actors becomes 
tremendously difficult. Less ambitiously, we thus turn to analyse if any divergences emerge in 
public and private biopharmaceutical innovations’ value and characteristics. In order to do so, we 
develop a patent analysis over two datasets including biopharmaceutical patents granted 
between 1976 and 2006. The first one collects patents from the USPTO Cross-Related Art 
References 514.810-935, while the second one, borrowed from Sampat and Lichtenberg 
(2011), includes all patents associated to New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from 1988 to 2005. Following the literature in the 
field, we investigate if the number of forward citations and the originality and generality 
indicators are significantly different for patent originated by public or academic organizations, 
vis-à-vis those belonging to private organizations. Our descriptive and multivariate analyses, 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, confirm our priors, suggesting that overall publicly funded 
research tends to be more cited and more basic (i.e. more general and original). At the same 
time, however, substantial differences emerge between the two datasets, suggesting that the 
respective roles of public and private actors may change depending on each specific 
innovation’s features.  
 
Based on this intuition, Chapter 6 suggests some policy implications and identifies some 
possible directions for future research in the field.  
 
1. Opening the “Black Box”  
“The change is always in the last resort  
a change in habits of thought.”  
T. Veblen, 1898 
 
1.1 Definitions and theoretical framework 
 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that innovation is a good thing. The greatest 
achievements of mankind in the last three centuries have been the result of extraordinary 
innovations.  
 
In fact, although the sparkle of curiosity has always led human beings to pursue new 
knowledge, the first systematic attempts to engage in innovative enterprises are relatively 
recent.1 Institutions governing innovation are, therefore, very young. Cicero prescribed that 
for the youth “prima commendiato proficiscitur a modestia”.2 As shown by some of the evidence 
reviewed in this work, however, the innovation system is probably behaving in an overly 
immodest manner, notwithstanding the fragile compromises that inform its roots and the 
multiple impasses it fell in during its even short life-time.3  
 
The strong intellectual appeal of Joseph Schumpeter’s work – who identified innovation as the 
“engine” of capitalistic economies -4 made the inquiry into the nature and causes of technical 
change one of the most animated battle camps in the often quixotic crusade for the 
advancement of social sciences.5 Schumpeter (1975 [1942]) wrote: 
                                                 
1 In fact, Scotchmer (2004) suggested that, in ancient societies, engineering was not regarded as “a subject fit for 
gentlemen”. The interest in preserving social order often prevailed against the adoption of “potentially subversive 
innovations.” pp. 6-7. In the Middle Ages, monasteries, universities and craftspeople gilds began to codify 
knowledge. Only at this point, some enlightened rulers started to grant prizes and patents; until the XIX century, 
however, most of them were discretionary octrayé. Ibidem 
2 “The chief recommendation is modesty”, Cicero, De Officis, Liber II, 46. 
3 See Dosi and Stiglitz (2014), p. 3. 
4 Following Ruttan (1959), we use here the terms innovation and technical change as synonyms.  
5 At the beginning of his masterpiece, Smith linked work productivity growth to the occurrence of three 
circumstances: “first […] the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, […] the saving of the 
time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, […] the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many”. 
Smith (1776), Book I, 1.5. The third point is easily identifiable with technical change. Dosi and Nelson (2010) 
noted that scholars started to look systematically inside the “black box of technology” only over the last 40 years. 
Freeman and Soete (1972) suggested that “the neglect of invention and innovation was not only due to other 
preoccupations of economists nor to their ignorance of technology; they were also the victims of their own 
assumptions and commitment to accepted systems of thought. These tended to treat the flow of new knowledge, 
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“Capitalism […] is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only 
never is but never can be stationary. And this evolutionary character of the 
capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on in a 
social and natural environment which changes and by its change alters the data of 
economic action; this fact is important and these changes (wars, revolutions and 
so on) often condition industrial change, but they are not its prime movers. Nor is 
this evolutionary character due to a quasi-automatic increase in population and 
capital or to the vagaries of monetary systems, of which exactly the same thing 
holds true. The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumers, goods, the new methods of production 
or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that 
capitalist enterprise creates.”6 
 
Innovation, however, is a fluid concept: easy to grasp but hard to inform. It is thus not 
surprising that, notwithstanding its increasing popularity in academic debates, a 
comprehensive definition of technical change is still missing.7  
 
Even Schumpeter, according to Hagedoorn (1996), did not leave any univocal definition 
throughout his extensive work: he only provided the classical distinction among invention (the 
creation of a new quid), innovation (occurring if and when the new quid is economically 
exploited) and diffusion (through competitors’ imitation or buyers’ purchases).8 
Schumpeterian innovation would therefore occur either if the production function’s form 
changed or if a new production function substituted the old one.9 Solow (1957) legitimized 
                                                                                                                                                    
of inventions and innovations as outside the framework of economic models, or more strictly, as ‘exogenous 
variable’.” p. 4.   
6 Schumpeter (1975 [1942]), pp. 82-85. 
7 Dosi (1989) suggested that “technical change is assumed, correctly, as one of the core stylised facts of modern 
development, without, however, specific investigation of its determinants and its procedures”. p. 2. 
8 “Innovation is possible without anything we should identify as invention, and invention does not necessarily 
induce innovation, but produces of itself [...] no economically relevant effect at all.” Schumpeter (1939), I.84. 
Dosi and Nelson (2010), however, suggested the inadequacy of this triadic framework in explaining actual 
technological change, p. 91. 
9 Schumpeter, loc. cit., pp. 87-88. This definition evokes the one by Solow (1957), who defined technical change 
as “any kind of shift in the production function”. p. 312. Nelson and Winter (1982) reviewed the history of 
growth theory and found that “by the late 1950s it had become apparent that it was impossible to explain very 
much of the increase in output per worker […] by movements along a production function resulting from 
increases in capital and other inputs per worker, if constant returns to scale and the other assumptions employed 
in traditional microeconomic theory were accepted. The ‘residual’ was as large as the portion of total output 
growth explained by growth of factors of production. […] Schumpeter […] and Hicks […] had proposed that 
innovation (technical change) could be viewed as a shift in the production function. In the late 1950s, Solow’s 
work (1957) made this notion an intellectually respectable part of neoclassical thinking about economic growth.”, 
p. 197. 
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this view, ascribing the unexplained share of productivity growth’s increase to technical 
change. Although being currently the “gold standard” of growth theories, however, this 
definition is still blurred.10 Innovation entails a dynamic process, a movement “towards the 
new”; economic science, eminently focused on static analysis, expectedly strived to include it 
within its theoretical framework. This in turn justified the efforts by heterodox thinkers – and 
particularly neo-schumpeterians – to develop a new theory of technical change.11  
 
Dosi (1984) distinguished two main approaches towards innovation: demand pull theories, 
identifying market forces as the ultimate driver of technical change, and technology push theories, 
supporting an autonomistic or quasi-autonomistic view of technology.12 Menell and 
Scotchmer (2005) further refined this scheme, defining four main models. The induced technical 
change model looks at changes in factor prices as the main determinant of technical change.13 
Neoclassicals, on the other hand, identify innovation with any exogenous change or a shift in a 
firm’s production function, without discussing its determinants. Green and Scotchmer (1995) and 
O’Donoghue et al. (1998) proposed a framework where new ideas are generated exogenously 
out of inventors’ imagination (again, a black box); however, in order to be developed and 
become actual innovation, ideas would need a financial investment, that needs to be 
effectively incentivized through public policy. Finally, evolutionary economists, re-interpreting 
Schumpeterian theory of “creative destruction”, hypothesise a relationship between R&D 
investment and profit margin: R&D investment would be held each time the profit margin 
drops below a certain line.14 
 
Because of their natural inclination towards dynamics – an uncontroversial characteristic of 
innovation - evolutionary approaches towards technical change certainly deserve the greatest 
attention.  
                                                 
10 Hagedoorn (1996) suggested that “regardless of the general benefits that production function analysis might 
have for economics, it has not been very successful in explaining the details and both the irregular and regular 
character of technical change in process innovations, let alone product innovations.” p. 887. 
11 See Screpanti and Zamagni (1992), Vol. 2, pp. 216-223. 
12 Dosi (1984), p. 8. Dosi, loc. cit. criticizes demand-pull theories for three reasons: (1) it is unrealistic to think to 
technological innovation as a purely passive and reactive process; (2) even if we accepted the demand-pull 
framework, technological development paths’ heterogeneity among different firms facing identical market 
impulses would remain un-explicated; (3) finally, an extreme focus on the demand side gives no convincing 
explanations of why inventive capabilities vary through time. Technology-push theories would suffer of specular 
flaws, pp. 10-11. 
13 In Hicks’ words: “a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to invention and 
inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the use of a factor which has become relatively 
expensive.” Hicks (1932 [1963]), pp. 124-125. 
14 The seminal contribution on the evolutionary theory of technical change is the one by Nelson and Winter 
(1982). 
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1.2 The origins of innovation  
 
The first definition of evolutionary economics is due to Thorstein Veblen. Veblen (1898) 
sharply criticized neoclassical economics as a taxonomic15 and teleological theory based on the 
unrealistic assumptions of perfect rationality and on the “reminiscences of the natural and the 
normal, of verities and tendencies, of controlling principles and disturbing causes”.16 According to him, 
human behavior was totally misinterpreted by the neoclassical “hedonistic conception of man 
[as a] lightning calculator of pleasures and pains who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of 
desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him 
intact.” Economic agents should have been regarded not as “human dat(a), in stable 
equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace (them) in one direction 
or another” but as “coherent structure(s) of propensities and habits which seek realization and 
expression in an unfolding activity.”17 
 
On the ground of these premises, Veblen (1898) proposed an evolutionary economics:18 “a 
theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by the economic interest, a theory of a 
cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms of the process itself.”19 The 
never-ending sequence of teleological acts, animated by different and changing ends, together 
with “that range of conventionalities and methods of life that are […] recognized as economic 
institutions” should have been the main subject of the new economic paradigm.20  
 
Dosi and Nelson (2010) proposed to represent technical change as an eminently evolutionary 
process where “at any time there are a wide variety of efforts going on to advance the 
technology, which to some extent are in competition with each other, as well as with the 
prevailing practices”.21 As for all evolutionary processes, a dose of uncertainty, duplication and 
mistake would thus affect technical change, as – contrarily to neoclassical representative 
                                                 
15 According to Veblen, static models describing human action as a gradual and natural approach towards 
“animistic” ends as ordre generale, represented “at (their) best, a body of logically consistent propositions 
concerning the normal relations of things a system of economic taxonomy”. Veblen (1898), p. 382. 
16 Ibidem, p. 379. 
17 Ibidem, p. 380. See also Ayres (1951), p. 49. 
18 For a comment on the Darwinian elements in Veblen’s theory, see Davis (1945) and Cordes (2007). 
19 Velen, loc. cit., p. 389. The distance from Robbins’ classical definition of economics is straightforward: 
“[economics is] the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between end and scarce means which 
have alternative use”. Robbins (1932), p. 16.  
20 According to Veblen, loc. cit., since the economic interest does not act in isolation, “there is […] no neatly 
isolable range of cultural phenomena that can be rigorously set apart under the head of economic institutions.” 
Economics would thus investigate those institutions, where the economic interest is most immediately and 
consistently visible, p. 381. 
21 Dosi and Nelson (2010), p. 64. 
16 
 
agents – innovators (both individuals and firms) are imperfectly rational and strongly 
heterogeneous.22 Landes and Posner (2003) suggested that evolutionary economists look at 
technical change as “a quasi-Darwinian process – a process almost of trial and error in which 
the market selects among diverse approaches whose relative promise cannot be assessed in 
advance”.23 Differently from standard biology-like models, however, the evolution of technical 
change is not likely to be a strictly random process and technical knowledge – differently from 
genetic makeup - is expected to be a shared rather than individual endowment.  
 
In this context, industries’ and firms’ specificities are likely to assume a pivotal role in 
determining the direction and the characteristics of technical change. Gambardella (1990) 
proposed an industry-based framework to identify innovation’s determinants. Depending on 
four main characteristics – (1) the decree of interaction between technology and science, (2) 
the product indivisibility and complexity, (3) the relationship between product and process 
innovations and (4) the influence of user’s feedback on the overall innovation process – each 
industry would present specific innovation patterns. Similarly, Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) 
distinguished the Schumpeter Mark I model, where innovation results from the fragmented 
efforts of a myriad of small enterprises, from Schumpeter Mark II model, characterised by highly 
concentrated R&D activities by few large corporations. Each of these models would prevail in 
different sectors, depending on their technological regimes, determined in turn by the industry’s 
opportunity, appropriability, and cumulativeness conditions and by the nature of the industry’s 
technological knowledge. Opportunity conditions are a proxy of easiness to innovate, and depend 
on the level (high or low), the variety (broad or narrow), the pervasiveness (in terms of 
markets and products) and sources (internal or external) of new technological opportunities. 
Appropriability conditions, on the other hand, refer to the possibility for an industry to protect its 
own inventions from imitation. Cumulativeness, in turn, may depend on the nature of 
technology, on the individual firm’s characteristics (e.g. a big R&D lab is likely to rely strongly 
on previous discoveries) and on the overall industrial sector’s features (typically, industries 
where knowledge is easily appropriable show higher degree of cumulativeness). Finally, the 
nature of an industry’s specific knowledge (i.e. its degree of tacitness and its complexity), together 
with its diffusion mechanisms (formal, such as patents or publications, or informal, through 
personal communication) would play a determinant role in shaping sectorial innovation 
patterns.  
                                                 
22 Nelson (1990), pp. 62-67.  
23 Landes and Posner (2003), p. 318. 
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Explaining technical change from an evolutionary standpoint would therefore involve the 
understanding of how new technologies are created and diffused in different institutional 
contexts. With regard to this, Dosi (1982) proposed a fascinating analogy between technical 
and scientific progress: both would rely on contingent paradigms, with economic and 
institutional forces operating as “selective devices” in determining the trajectory, which 
ultimately indicates “those directions […] to pursue and those to neglect”.24  
 
Building on these theoretical pillars, Dosi and Nelson (2010) defined technology as all “human 
designed means for achieving a particular end”, i.e. pieces of knowledge, procedures and artefacts.25 
Knowledge and its accumulation dynamics, in particular, are central in explaining the 
biopharmaceutical industry’s innovation patterns.26   
1.3 Markets failure and its discontents 
  
The economic analysis of information is a relatively young but very fecund research field in 
social sciences.27 Scientific and technical knowledge can be regarded as peculiar forms of 
information. Similarly to information, in fact, knowledge is to a certain extent public - i.e. non-
rivalrous and at least partially non-excludable -28 it generates externalities and, as far as its 
reproduction is un-expensive, it presents increasing returns to scale.29  
 
                                                 
24 Dosi (1982). Dosi, loc. cit. defined technological paradigm as “a model and a pattern of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected  material 
technologies.”, p. 152. 
25 Dosi, loc. cit. defined technology as “a set of pieces of knowledge, both directly ‘practical’ (related to concrete 
problems and device) and ‘theoretical’ (but practically applicable although not necessarily already applied), know-
how, methods, procedures, experience of success and failures, and also, of course, physical devices and 
equipment.” p. 152.  According to the author, this definition is “impressionistic” enough to resemble the one of 
science. However, the different decree of implicitness importantly distinguishes technological from scientific 
knowledge. Ibidem, p. 153. 
26 Tacit knowledge, procedures and artefacts also play an important role in biopharmaceuticals. However, 
knowledge stands out as the main industry’s technological regime component. See Gambardella (1990).  
27 The seminal works in the field include those by Arrow (1962), Akerlof (1970) and Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1986). 
28 Although public goods have always been part of the economic discourse, starting from Smith (1776) and 
Hume (1739), the first formal definition of public goods is due to Samuelson (1954): “collective consumption 
goods [are those] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such goods leads 
to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good”, p. 387. Hume (1739) had already 
foreseen the market failure problem, predicting that in the case of common goods, everyone will try to “free 
himself of the trouble and expense, and […] lay the whole burden on others”. The theory of public goods has 
attracted great attention in the last few decades. See Kaul et al. (1999a, 1999b).  
29
 Arrow (1996) explained that “Technical information needed for production is used once and for all. The same 
information is used regardless of the scale of production. Hence, there is an extreme form of increasing returns.” 
p. 649.  
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At the same time, however, knowledge – and in particular technical knowledge - shows some 
distinctive features: it usually includes a set of “tacit” elements (routines, habits, recipes) that 
complicate its transmission and codification.30 In the words of Ramello (2008), “knowledge is 
not just a good or resource, defined and delimited like standard goods produced and 
exchanged on the markets, but a dynamic entity and a cognitive tool pertaining to social 
groups that is crucial to both the individual and to social action.”31 The peculiar nature of 
knowledge, both scientific and technological, is the main reason why public policies, either 
through direct investment or by granting temporary monopolies, have always played an active 
role in promoting its accumulation.  
 
In fact, relying on a set of strong assumptions on knowledge diffusion, neoclassical economics 
suggests that competitive markets systematically fail in supplying the socially optimum amount 
of knowledge. Being knowledge a public good, imitation would instantaneously occur every 
time an innovation comes to the light, eroding the innovator’s profit margins and thus 
nullifying any subsequent incentive to innovate. As effectively summarized by Arrow (1962), 
perfectly competitive markets are expected to fail when dealing with knowledge “because it is 
risky, because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent and because of 
increasing returns in use”.32 Within the neoclassical framework, the social benefits of 
innovation are greater than those appropriable by private agents both in a perfectly 
competitive and in a monopolistic scenario. The case for government intervention is thus 
extremely strong. In the case of knowledge, however – differently from other standard cases 
of public goods, such as defence – public policy assumed some uniquely peculiar features.  
 
According to David (2003), three institutional arrangements (the three “Ps”) have been put 
into place over time. Alongside patronage (mainly under the shape of prizes) and procurement (i.e. 
contracting for innovations with public purposes) – the traditional channels of government 
support - property (under the shape of intellectual property rights, IPRs) has emerged as the 
predominant response to the original market failure. Dosi and Stiglitz (2014) underlined that 
                                                 
30 Dasgupta and David (1994), p. 227. Nelson and Dosi (2010) defined tacitness as “the inability by the actors 
[…] to explicitly articulate the sequences of procedures by which ‘things are done’, problems are solved, 
behavioural patterns are formed etc.”, p. 58. 
31 Ramello (2008), p. 78. Kaul et al. (1999a, 1999b) proposed a new theory of public goods from a global 
perspective, with non-rivalry and non-excludability being only one of the publicness determinants, together with 
publicness in the decision-making process leading to the good’s supply and publicness in the distribution of 
benefits coming from the good’s supply.  
32 Arrow (1962), p. 619. See also Scotchmer (2004) and Dosi and  Stiglitz (2014). 
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“unlike other public goods where we rely on government provision, we turn to the private 
sector for both production and financing of much innovation”.33  
 
Malerba and Torrisi (2000) proposed a more detailed framework. Alongside IPRs, the 
government can overcome markets’ inability to produce enough knowledge through subsidies, 
fiscal incentives and direct R&D. Subsidies and tax breaks, similarly to IPRs, are a 
decentralised device: the regulator does not indicate the research direction to pursue, but only 
provides financial resources for scientists, who are ultimately free to develop the most 
valuable projects in their own view. Direct government R&D, on the other hand, may be 
politically trickier, since it encompasses the explicitation of government’s priorities. 
Furthermore, Menell and Scotchmer (2005) suggested that large publicly funded institutes may 
be inefficient, since – by employing a necessarily limited number of researchers - they would 
not leverage all the best available human capital. Subsidies, in turn, may crowd-out private 
investments and lead subsidies’ winners to game, in the absence of appropriate performance 
measurement mechanisms.34 Tax-based incentives, finally, naturally discriminate against small 
companies and start-ups with tight profit margins. Foray and Lissoni (2010) found that, mainly 
because of the decentralization, subsidies have been gradually gaining the “lion share” of 
public innovation policies in most OECD countries, especially in those sectors – such as the 
biopharmaceutical - where the role of basic science is more substantial.35  
 
If the assumptions underlying the market failure argument were consistent with real world 
knowledge dynamics, all the analysed policies would be theoretically effective in avoiding the 
market’s under-investment in innovative activities. However, the hypotheses behind the works 
by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) are strong ones: knowledge is regarded as a pure public 
good, and innovation is described as a linear process, with publicly funded science preceding 
privately developed technology.36 Science and technology would thus be temporarily and 
institutionally distinguishable: Dasgupta and David (1994) suggested the two domains to be 
differentiated in “the goals accepted as legitimate within the two communities of researchers, 
(in) the norms of behaviour especially in regard to the disclosure of knowledge, and (in) the 
features of the reward system”.37 The Open Science model, firstly theorized by Merton (1973), 
                                                 
33 Dosi and Stiglitz, loc. cit., p. 7. 
34 For a review of the empirical literature on public-private R&D interaction, see David et al. (2000).  
35 Foray and Lissoni (2010), p. 281. 
36 See Malerba (2000), p. 39. 
37 Dasgupta and David (1994), p. 228. 
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resulted in a “cumulative, chain-linked impetus to the advance of knowledge.”38 Technology, 
on the other hand, would be mostly profit-driven. Furthermore, Chan et al. (2014) argued the 
two domains to be focused on different time frames, with science looking forward and 
technology pursuing short-term and easily marketable projects. Nelson (1959) suggested that 
the substantial externalities and the strong knightian uncertainty characterising basic science 
would tremendously reduce the incentive for private firms to engage in R&D.39 Figure 1 
seems to confirm this theoretical hypothesis.  
 
Figure 1: U.S. R&D funding sources by research-stage, 2011 
 
Source: National Science Foundation, 2011 
 
From their evolutionary perspective, however, Dosi and Nelson (2010) suggested that 
scientific and technical knowledge do not always interact linearly. On the one hand, science 
would necessarily need technical knowledge to be applied and technology would often be 
itself an input for scientific research; on the other hand, technologies may arise independently 
(and sometimes even before) their corresponding scientific theory.  
 
                                                 
38 Ibidem, p. 233. 
39 Differently from standard risk, knightian uncertainty is immeasurable. Keynes (1937) made this concept 
popular: “By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for 
certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty […] Or, 
again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense 
in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper 
and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private 
wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.” pp. 213-214. 
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Kline and Rosenberg (1986) proposed a chain model, where – oppositely to the linear 
framework – innovation would result from the so called “analytical design”, i.e. the analysis of 
possible combination of existing materials that may be able to satisfy the market impulse, 
while leveraging the new scientific knowledge and taking into account the consumers’ 
feedback. Dosi et al. (2006) further criticized both the linear model of innovation and the 
market failure argument. First, the standard model would rest on the existence of a 
“theoretical […] benchmark of efficiency against which policy and institutional interventions 
should be compared”.40 Second, it would lie upon a static notion of market efficiency, quite far 
from the evolutionary one. The latter, in fact, sees markets as places where “novelty is 
(imperfectly) produced, (imperfectly) tested and (imperfectly) selected”.41 Third, the clear-cut 
distinction between the profit-maximizing private actors and government, intervening only as 
a market failure corrector may look unrealistic vis-à-vis the recent innovation systems’ 
evolution. Last, but not least, technical knowledge is only quasi-public: in fact, it is often firm or 
industry-specific and costly to reproduce.42  
 
If innovation is regarded as a cumulative process of “imperfect adaptation and mistake-ridden 
discoveries”,43 the whole neoclassical framework loses most of its explanatory power. In fact, 
Malerba and Torrisi (2000) suggested that innovation policies should not be shaped on the 
simple market failure argument. Rather, they would need to provide contingent and specific 
answers to failures in learning processes and in complementarities’ development, while solving 
some crucial innovation trade-offs. As for the learning failures, the shortage of human capital or 
the lack of R&D investment could create “bottlenecks” and subsequently hinder technical 
change. Furthermore, asymmetric information and inadequate coordination among firms and 
organizations may delay the development of inter and intra-organizational complementarities. 
Finally, trade-off exist between broader or focused research targets (variety vs. selection) and 
between technology protection and diffusion. In all these cases, government intervention can 
push for one solution or the other. More concretely, Malerba and Torrisi (2000) suggested 
that, notwithstanding the fundamental role of the government in funding basic science (both 
to push the knowledge frontier forward and to produce positive spillovers for the industry 
through researchers’ education), public policy should support all those projects that, because 
                                                 
40 Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali (2006), p. 1112. 
41 Ibidem. 
42 See Nelson (1990), p. 65. Bessen and Maskin (2009) suggested that in most industries substantial “frictions” 
would impede the immediate and cheap reproduction of newly produced knowledge.  
43 Ibidem, p. 159. Nelson (2004) defined technological advance as a “collective, cultural, evolutionary process.” p. 
458.  
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of their high uncertainty and complexity, are neglected by profit-maximizing actors. 
Furthermore, the role of public agencies would also involve the development of partnerships 
and agreements to maximize the synergies and complementarities among researchers working 
on similar issues. Nelson (1959) had anticipated this intuition, suggesting that only 
government support would have granted knowledge to be “administered as a common 
pool”.44 Finally, the public hand would be pivotal in solving the variety vs. selection and 
protection vs. diffusion trade-offs: not only publicly funded science is an institutional 
mechanism to sustain knowledge’s breadth, but the government is ultimately responsible for 
the appropriability regimes’ design. Differently from the neoclassical optimal-policy case, in an 
evolutionary framework the public hand is expected to assume a much more flexible shape. 
Furthermore, its influence is likely to extend itself beyond the basic research domain. Nelson 
(1990) suggested that public policies can not only promote general advances in science, but 
also produce specific equipments and pursue short-term needs of citizens or industry.  
1.4 Towards a systemic view on innovation 
 
If the dividing line between science and technology – so clear in the neoclassical framework – 
fades away, the spheres of public and private action subsequently result blurred.45 
 
The concept of “innovation systems”, firstly introduced by Freeman (1987), effectively 
accounts for this hybridization. According to Freeman (1987), technical change would result 
from a network of public and private institutions “whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify and diffuse new technologies”.46  In other words, it would be the final output 
of the simultaneous, synergic (and sometimes even overlapping) effort of different actors, not 
necessarily disposed linearly along the innovation chain. Similarly, Nelson (1986) had 
suggested that public and private institutions operate within larger innovation ecosystems. 
Analysing data from the Carnegie Mellon Survey, Cohen et al. (2002) found that, according to 
more than 30% of the respondents, publicly funded research played an important or essential 
role for the initiation and completion of new projects.47 Some 30% of the sample reported the 
publication of publicly-funded research to be the main channel of government contribution to 
                                                 
44 Nelson (1957), pp. 735-736. This result is consistent with the theoretical analysis by Spinesi (2013). 
45 Menell and Scotchmer (2005), p. 55. 
46 Freeman (1987), p. 1. 
47 Cohen et al. (2002), p. 6. Pharmaceutical companies represent an important deviation from this result: more 
than 58% of the respondents reported publicly funded research to be crucial to stimulate new projects and more 
than 20% indicated it as the most important information source. The Carnegie Mellon Survey collects interviews 
to R&D managers from 1,267 firms operating in 34 industrial sectors.  
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innovation development. Furthermore, only 18% of the respondents indicated patents as the 
most important information source on public research: scientific publications (41%), 
conferences and meetings (35%) and informal interaction (36%) were reported to be far more 
relevant.48 These results are consistent with the analysis by Mansfield (1991), who found that 
11% of new products and 9% of new processes developed by the U.S. industry from 1975 to 
1985 could not have been developed without the input of academic research. Narin et al. 
(1997) analysed the non-patent references of patents issued by the USPTO in 1987 and 1988: 
73% of them regarded U.S. or foreign publicly-funded research.49  The public-private 
dichotomy may therefore be inadequate in order to catch the biunivocal flows of knowledge 
that characterize today’s innovation systems. 
 
Block (2011) further developed this intuition, and built an original and comprehensive 
“mushroom” framework to describe the current U.S. innovation system (see Figure 2). In fact, 
according to Block (2011), the role of the U.S. government is both financially and strategically 
ubiquitous – as the soil for a mushroom. Substantial flows of resources are injected from 
Washington in the innovation system, and federal programs de facto shape the whole U.S. R&D 
agenda while absorbing the complex innovation network’s failures. Moving up to the 
mushroom’s stems, Academia is crucial as far as it produces important scientific and technical 
knowledge that is then diffused through a thick ecosystem of public and private organizations: 
incubators, venture capitals, publicly-funded support programs. At the top of the mushroom, 
the federal government reappears through its academic spin-offs support programs and 
through industry-university cooperative R&D agreements. Finally, large corporations close the 
convoluted R&D chain, by bringing the new product or process on the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Again, the pharmaceutical industry is an exception, with consistently higher value assigned to the whole 
spectrum of information sources: patents (50%), scientific publications (73%), conferences and meetings (65%), 
informal interaction (58%), recent hires (31%), licences (34%), joint ventures (41%), contract research (53%), 
consulting (59%), personal exchange (9%). Cohen et al. (2002), p. 15. 
49 The pharmaceutical industry shows a closer linkage with public research: 79% of the total non-patent 
references of pharmaceutical patents regarded US or foreign publicly funded research. Narin et al. (1997), p. 328. 
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Figure 2: The “mushroom” model of innovation systems 
 
Source: Adapted from Block (2011) 
 
The model by Block (2011) regards technical change as the ultimate result of a series of 
systematic interactions among academic institutions, small businesses, research centres and - at 
late development stage - large businesses.50 This result is coherent with the findings of Block 
and Keller (2009), who reported that the share of breakthrough innovations coming from 
large corporation experienced a steep decrease in the last decades. On the contrary, the role of 
small research-based enterprises – often directly or indirectly publicly funded - would have 
considerably expanded.51 In the new highly complex, strongly capital-intensive, uncertain and 
interdependent innovation systems, only the government seems able to absorb the system’s 
failures. And, as showed in the next chapter, standard policy devices such as patents - based 
on an obsolete representation of technical change – may finally result inadequate.  
                                                 
50 Block and Keller (2009) analysed the innovation awarded by the specialized magazine R&D 100.  
51 See also Nightingale and Mahdi (2006). 
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2. Panda’s Thumb Revisited 
“Ne laissez pas tous faire,  
ne laissez pas tous passer.” 
J. B. A. M. Jobard, 1844 
2.1 Pandas….at the pharmacy 
 
Notoriously, pandas love bamboos. Tender bamboo leaves, in fact, represent 99% of giant 
pandas’ diet. Taking into account the Chinese bears’ peculiar food habit, evolution provided 
them with what may resemble a sixth finger. More specifically, pandas developed a peculiarly 
large radial sesamoid, a wrist’s bone that gradually took the shape of a thumb. Of course, it is a 
rough and inflexible device compared to human opposable thumb; but still, it is there.  
 
 Figure 3: Panda’s Thumb 
 
Source: Gould (1980), p. 22 
 
Equally notoriously, however, pandas are endangered. In fact, the strict bamboo diet is not 
only nutritionally poor, but also inappropriate for a bear whose digestive apparatus – originally 
carnivorous - is incompatible with a vegetarian diet. As a result, pandas lack the necessary 
energies to reproduce themselves: by supporting pandas’ “culinary” tastes, the thumb would 
thus be accelerating their extinction.  
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David (2003) argued that intellectual property arrangements are similar to pandas’ thumbs: 
they are the imperfect result of a series of evolutionary mutations, but they are still serviceable 
in promoting innovation.  
 
The biopharmaceutical sector may look at first glance as the “living” proof of the validity of 
David’s (2003) intuition. In fact, the industry has traditionally regarded patents as the essential 
incentive to innovate. Boldrin and Levine (2008) and Cohen et al. (2000) reported that 
pharmaceutical companies rely strongly on patents as a comparative advantage instrument (see 
Table 1).52 Arora et al. (2002) coherently found a significantly positive elasticity of R&D 
expenditure to increases in patent premium (9.7%, compared to a market average of 6%).  
 
Table 1: Percentage of companies considering each IPR protection system as “fundamental” 
 
Source: Boldrin & Levine (2002), p. 20 
 
On the other hand, however, in this sector, the social welfare price of patent protection may 
be particularly high. In fact, in the monopolistic regime granted by patents, firms are expected 
to charge high monopoly prices, which may exclude large shares of patients from life-saving 
treatments.53 
 
The lesser evil, it could be argued.54 However, the disappointing industry innovative 
performance – documented in Chapter 3 – somehow questions the effectiveness of patents in 
                                                 
52 In other industries, patents are not listed among the most effective intellectual property protection mechanisms 
because of the high administrative costs and the full disclosure requirement. See Cohen et al. (2000). 
53 In a monopolistic context, the link between final price and investment costs is at best weak. In the words of 
Gilead’s C.E.O., who commented the commercialization of the new Hepatitis C drug Sofosbuvir, marketed at 
$80,000 per dose: “First and foremost, the value of a cure, I tend to think, is underestimated in terms of the 
overall advantage that the health care system receives from it”. New York Times, April 23rd 2014. Available 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/your-money/gilead-revenue-soars-on-hepatitis-c-
drug.html?_r=0. 
54 Franz Machlup, in 1958, had  stated that: “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have 
Product Innovation Process Innovation
Industry Average Pharma Industry Average Pharma
Secrecy 51,00% 53,57% 50,59% 68,13%
Lead Time 52,76% 50,10% 38,43% 35,52%
Complem. Manuf. 45,61% 49,39% 43,00% 44,17%
Complem. Sales 42,74% 33,37% 30,73% 25,21%
Patents 34,83% 50,20% 23,30% 36,15%
Other Legal 20,71% 20,82% 15,39% 16,04%
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sustaining technical change. Just like pandas’ thumbs, patents may be actually stifling rather 
than reinforcing the overall innovation pace.  
 
As it often occurs in social sciences, however, the theoretical model justifying patents 
succeeded rather than preceded the practice of IPRs: in the words of Landes (1969), it is pure 
“pragmatism gilded by principle”.55 Therefore, in order to correctly assess if and to what 
extent the patent system is working in promoting technical change, the historical and 
institutional determinants underlying  its diffusion need to be carefully considered.  
2.2 Nihil novi sub sole 
 
“Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be driven 
out of the market by his rival, who finding himself, without any expense, in 
possession of a discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, 
would be able to deprive him of all his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower 
price.”56  
 
Bentham (1839) was among the first supporters of patents as a system to spur innovation. 
However, his view was all but universally shared. The XIX century was at the same time the 
age of patents’ outburst and the one of the famous “patent controversy”. In fact, Machlup and 
Penrose (1950) reported that a lively debate used to inflame scholars and policy makers all 
over Europe: some of them confidently welcomed the diffusion of patents, others warned 
against their potentially detrimental effects. Patent system’s supporters grounded their position 
on four main justifications: first of all, the inventor was believed to hold a natural right to 
dispose of her own invention; secondly, fairness suggested that a reward was deserved by those 
who had successfully engaged in innovative activities; furthermore, patents were intended as 
prizes, incentivizing researchers to produce new knowledge; finally, patent system was regarded 
as an effective system to grant full disclosure of new discoveries. On the other hand, opponents 
of patent law rebutted that patents were nothing but a monopoly privilege:57 their 
administrative and social cost would have been considerably greater than their alleged benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                    
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to 
recommend abolishing it.” 
55 The first model of optimal patent length, for instance, is due to Nordhaus (1969).   
56 Bentham (1839), p. 71 
57 Machlup and Penrose (1950) provided anecdotic evidence that the provision of patents under the name of 
“intellectual property” within the French Constitution was the result of purely lexical considerations: the term 
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The fact that current arguments in favour and against patent protection almost perfectly trace 
the ones of two centuries ago is quite significant: apparently, a full theoretical convergence on 
patent system’s appropriateness has never occurred. However, Machlup and Penrose (1950) 
reported that, although “the academic controversy about the patent of invention did not end 
in any ‘decision’ […] the political controversy […] ended with a victory for the patent 
advocates.”58  
 
Memory, the adage goes, is the mother of all wisdoms. Looking at the current shape of patent 
system, however, the patent controversy seems to have left no trace at all. Notwithstanding 
(and probably because of) its extreme simplicity, the blackboard economic model justifying 
intellectual property finally succeeded as the dominating innovation policy paradigm. In fact, 
Boldrin and Levine (2008) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) showed that patent laws were gradually 
adopted by most developed countries.59 In the U.S., the Constitution itself provided the 
Congress with the power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”60  
 
Nowadays, the role of patents has even expanded. Gervais (2002) proposed to divide the 
history of IP law in different “eras”, marked by some major institutional breakthroughs. At 
the end of the XIX century, European countries used to underwrite bilateral agreements for 
mutual recognition of IPRs. This network, however, became soon too intricate: Paris 
Convention (1883) and Berne Convention (1886) laid the foundations for the establishment of 
the Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle (or "BIRPI") – lately 
renamed as the World Intellectual Property (WIPO) – and ratified important provisions such 
as national treatment and compulsory licensing.61 Only in 1994, governments worldwide 
committed for a positive international IPRs system, aiming at overthrowing the existing barriers 
                                                                                                                                                    
“privilege” was eminently anti-revolutionary, therefore the Constitutional Assembly opted for “property”, more 
politically acceptable. pp. 15-16. 
58 Ibidem, p. 29. 
59 The first patent was granted in the XV century Venice to “accutissimi Ingegni, apti ad excogitar et trouar varij Ingegnosi 
artificij”. See Boldrin and Levine (2008), Ch. 3, p. 1. 
60 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
61 National treatment clauses obliges each member of the convention to grant other member states’ patents the 
same protection as national ones. Compulsory licensing provisions are applied by national governments 
whenever the exclusive right granted by the patent may result in abuses or collide with public interest. See WIPO 
(2004), pp. 242-248. 
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to free trade.62 The World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) specified a minimum set of provisions that de facto 
produced a global harmonization of IP law worldwide.63  
 
In recent years, the focus on “knowledge economy” has even increased the importance of 
patents in the public debate around innovation and development.64 In the words of Stiglitz 
(2008): 
 
“Intellectual property has become one of the major issues of our global society. 
Globalization is one of the most important issues of the day, and intellectual 
property is one of the most important aspects of globalization, especially as the 
world moves toward a knowledge economy. How we regulate and manage the 
production of knowledge and the right of access to knowledge is at the center of 
how well this new economy, the knowledge economy, works and of who 
benefits. At stake are matters of both distribution and efficiency.”65  
 
Simultaneously, however, especially in the U.S., the awareness of patent system’s flaws has 
been growing.  
2.3 Patents: theory and practice 
 
As all legal devices, patents were born to balance different and diverging interests. 
Understanding their technical features is crucial in order to better catch their rationale. A 
patent is a document issued upon application by a dedicated office, describing an invention 
and giving the inventor the right to exclude others from exploiting (i.e. manufacturing, using, 
                                                 
62 This question is well posed by Dasgupta and David (1994): “Why should any nation continue to devote a 
significant portion of its public expenditure to advancing scientific knowledge if, through the global networks of 
the international science community, those new discoveries soon will be made available to allies and rivals alike?” 
p. 223. 
63 Gervais (2002) underlined that “as astonishing as the results of the TRIPS negotiations can seem, the 
internationalization of intellectual property protection since 1883, may be summarized as an expansion in depth 
and geographical coverage of the protection, always along the lines of the systems of protection that existed in a 
few industrialized Western countries in the nineteenth century.” p. 948. Economists, philosophers and policy-
makers have been criticizing the TRIPs for years: the agreement would, in fact, hinder the development of part 
of the world while protecting the interests of Western countries. See also Cimoli et al. (2014), Stiglitz (2008), 
Blodrin and Levine (2008) and Coriat et al. (2006). 
64 Already Hughes (1988) predicted that “as our attention continues to shift from tangible to intangible forms of 
property, we can expect a growing jurisprudence of intellectual property.” p. 1. 
65 Stiglitz (2008), p. 1695. 
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selling and importing) it without her consent.66 The “mechanism” of patent protection may be 
articulated in three pillars.  
 
First, the right to exclude others from using her own invention de facto gives the inventor a 
temporary legal monopoly. Some important technical provisions are, therefore, aimed at 
minimizing monopolies’ deadweight losses: in order to be patentable, a product needs to be 
useful,67 novel,68 and non-obvious.69 Furthermore, national governments reserve their right to 
exclude some classes of products from patentability in order to protect ordre public, human or 
animal health and to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.70  
 
Second, patent system is expected to ensure the full disclosure of patented products’ 
characteristics, “in a manner sufficiently clear for the invention to be carried out by a person 
skilled in the art.”71 From this perspective, patents represent an important knowledge diffusion 
tool. In fact, Arora, et al. (2001) suggested that strong patents would promote technology 
transfer via licensing, while encouraging small firms to engage in R&D activities with the 
prospect of selling their innovations on the market.72 
 
Finally, patents are a flexible legal instrument. Their length and breadth can be tuned in order 
to balance their dynamic incentivizing function with the static deadweight loss they produce. As 
for the duration, TRIPs Agreement uniformed patent duration on twenty years.73 Breadth, on 
the other hand, is a measure of the patent protection scope and is usually defined by the 
                                                 
66 WIPO (2004), pp. 17-22. Art. 25 US Code § 154 provides a substantially identical definition of patents, as 
those documents giving “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, 
of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing 
into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.” 
In legal terms, a patent simply grants the inventor the right “to prevent third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” the patented product (or the 
product obtained from the patented process) and to prevent other unauthorized parties from using the process. 
Furthermore, the patentee also gets the right to “assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude 
licensing contracts.” 
67 WIPO distinguishes among the general concept of utility from the one of “industrial applicability”, which 
implies the possibility to apply use the patented process to perform a technical activity on a certain scale. The 
specific interpretation of this requirement tends to vary among different legislations. See WIPO (2004), p. 18 
68 WIPO defined “prior art” as “all the knowledge that existed prior to the relevant filing or priority date of a 
patent application, whether it existed by way of written or oral disclosure.” WIPO (2004), p. 19 
69 See WIPO (2004), p. 19. 
70 TRIPS Artt. 27, cc.1-3.  
71 WIPO (2004), p. 21. 
72 Arora et al. (2001), pp. 115-141.  
73 TRIPs art. 33. Nordhaus (1969) proposed a model of optimal patent duration. For some early re-
interpretations of his path-breaking model, see Scherer (1972) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990).  
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number of claims,74 i.e. the spectrum of product features that - if used without the inventor’s 
permission - give her the right to undertake legal action against any infringer.75 
 
Critiques to this apparently innocuous three-pillar model mainly originated from two streams 
of literature: economic history on the one hand, and evolutionary theories of technical change 
on the other. 
 
In her path-breaking article, Moser (2003) analysed the portfolio of all innovations presented 
at the London Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851, and found that only 11% of total British 
exhibits (and 15% of British award winning inventions) had been patented. Moser (2012) 
investigated the relationship between national patent laws and the patenting behaviour of 
innovators in XIX century world fairs: inventors coming from countries with weaker patent 
protection were more likely to operate in sectors where intellectual property mechanisms 
other than patents were effective. Moser (2012) concluded that “patent laws may influence the 
direction of technological change and help to encourage the diffusion of knowledge, even 
though patent laws do not appear to be a necessary or sufficient condition for higher rates of 
innovation.” Moser and Voena (2009) reported a significant positive effect of the U.S. 
chemicals’ compulsory licensing during World War II. Lerner (2002) found that policies 
resulting in stronger patent laws had a negligible impact on innovation rates. On the contrary, 
R&D expenditure was reported to play a far more decisive role. Boldrin et al. (2008) reported 
the interesting case of steam engines in the XVIII century Cornwall. Building on previous 
research by Nuvolari (2004) and Nuvolari and Verspagen (2008), they showed that the 
diffusion of patents on new engines’ components stifled and delayed the advent of new and 
more efficient machineries. In fact, the cumulative nature of innovation in the field of 
pumping engine was more compatible with a collective invention setting, where competing firms 
shared their technical knowledge, than with a rigid patent regime.76 Boldrin and Levine (2008) 
reviewed patent policy evolution in Europe and in the U.S., and showed that most of the great 
innovations of the last two centuries were not motivated by the promise of monopolistic 
rents. Looking at the pharmaceutical sector, in particular, they found no significant differences 
                                                 
74 Jaffe and Lerner (2004) defined claims as the “legal characterization of what is and is not covered by the 
patent”. p. 28. 
75 To this end, the so called doctrine of equivalents “indicates that an infringer should not be allowed to continue his 
actions where he basically makes use of the patented invention while merely substituting a variant for an element 
of the invention which is equivalent technically and functionally to the element as contained in the patent claim, 
irrespective of whether the variant used by the infringer turns out to be an improvement or otherwise.” Possible 
legal actions against patent infringement include money damages – calculated as “lost-profit” – or injunctions – 
that are supposed to end the infringement activity. See Scotchmer (2005) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004).  
76 See Nuvolari (2004). 
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in industry evolution among countries granting patent protection and “late-comers” (such as 
France, Italy or Germany), which introduced drug patents only in the last decades of XX 
century.77 
 
Historical evidence, therefore, does not provide a strong argument for patent protection:  
 
“There is virtually no robust evidence supporting the idea that higher expected 
profits translate into higher search efforts and more frequent innovative success. 
Of course, if the expected profits are zero, most often search investments by 
private agents are zero too (but not always: see the open-source software history!). 
In any case, above some appropriability threshold incentives do not seem to exert 
any major impact upon the rates of innovation, Rather, the latter seem to be 
critically affected by the nature of paradigm-specific technological opportunities, 
the characteristics of the search space, and the capabilities of would be 
investors.”78 
 
Recent history, on the other hand, offers some quite uncontroversial evidence that casts some 
shadows on the effectiveness of patent system in spurring innovation. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) 
suggested that, in the last few decades, institutional constraints aiming at minimizing patent 
deadweight losses in the U.S. have been gradually relaxed. First, the number of patentable 
matters would have been growing steadily, due to particularly generous court decisions. 
Second, the “non-obviousness” and “novelty” requirements would have been mitigated, also 
because of the increasing budget constraints faced by the USPTO. 79 Finally, the reliance on 
juries in patent trials would have increased, promoting more favourable decisions for patent 
holders.80  
 
In light of this, the increasing number of patent application and grants (see Figure 4) may 
actually represent an alarm bell rather than the ultimate proof of the U.S. growing 
inventiveness. In fact, Handerson et al. (1997) found that the Bayh-Dole Act – which allowed 
                                                 
77 The case of Italy is remarkable: before the Supreme Court Act that introduced pharmaceutical products’ 
patents, c. 9.3% of total new chemical compounds worldwide were discovered in Italy. After the law passed, the 
percentage decreased to 7.5%. See Boldrin and Levine (2002), Ch. 9, pp. 10-11. 
78 Orsenigo et al. (2006), p. 412. 
79 The resource scarcity would have hindered the USPTO’s ability to attract talented examiners and shortened the 
examination times. Jaffe and Lerner (2004), pp. 127-150. 
80 Jaffe and Lerner, loc. cit., argued that juries composed by ordinary citizens, lacking the necessary technical 
skills, tend to be more sympathetic to patent holder. p. 122. 
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patentability for federally-funded inventions – produced an increase in patent applications 
and, simultaneously, a deterioration of patents’ quality.81 These facts are reflected by the 
dramatic increase of IP cases in U.S. civil courts (see Figure 5).82 Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and 
Arora et al. (2001), finally, reported an increase in the anti-competitive use of patents (such as 
patent-thickets, patent trolls, blocking patents and strategic litigation).83  
 
Figure 4: USPTO patent yearly applications and grants, 1963-2011 
 
 Source: USPTO, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: IP and patent cases in U.S. courts, 1988-2012 
                                                 
81 University patents issued before the Bayh–Dole Act were significantly more likely to be cited than a random 
sample of all U.S. patents; after the law passed, this difference gradually diminished and lost any statistical 
significance. Sampat et al. (2003) more recently contradicted this result that would be biased by truncation 
problems. In fact, they found the intertemporal distribution of patent citations to be gradually shifting in time: 
university patents would thus take a longer time to be cited. This phenomenon has been explained in opposite 
ways: Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) suggested that earlier citations are correlated with better patent value; 
Sampat et al. (2003), on the other hand, suggested that lagged citations may be an indicator of higher basicness of 
university discoveries, that may take more time to be incorporated in final, patentable innovations. 
82 The 2013 Norton Rose Fulbright “Litigation Trends Survey Report”, reports that 28% (versus 19% in 2012) of 
the U.S. companies chose IP/patent disputes as those of greatest concern. 19% of the respondents reported 
IP/Patent lawsuits to be one of the most numerous types of pending litigations in 2013. Available online at 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/files/Norton%20Rose%20Fulbright%20Annual%20Litigation%20Trends.pdf. 
For a comprehensive review of the characteristics and trends in patent litigation see Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2001, 2004). 
83 See Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Arora et al. (2001a, 2001b). 
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Source: United States Courts - Judicial Facts and Figures, 201284 
2.4 Darwin knocking at the USPTO door 
 
Therefore, historical and current empirical evidence suggests that patent system may be 
stifling rather than promoting innovation. The most radical critique to patents and IPRs, 
however, comes from a theoretical ground. Hughes (1998) suggested that “a strict Darwinian 
marketplace of ideas might serve as a foundation to oppose legal protection for the content of 
expressions. In such a view, valuable ideas and expressions will always survive because value is 
an evolutionary armor. […] Changes, or ‘mutations’, increase the longevity and usefulness of 
the idea or expression.”85  
 
In fact, Dosi et al. (2006) criticized the standard economic justification for patents, starting 
from the evolutionary economics’ principles already presented in Chapter 1. A stand-alone 
model of innovation such as the one underlying IPRs protection is hardly reconcilable with 
the evolutionary definition of technical change as a process of “imperfect adaptation and 
mistake-ridden discoveries”.86 In her path-breaking article, Scotchmer (1991) argued: 
 
“Most economics literature on patenting […] has looked at innovations in 
isolation, without focusing on the externalities or spillovers that early innovators 
                                                 
84 Av. online at: http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-2012.aspx 
85 Hughes (1988), p. 50. 
86 Ibidem, p. 159. Nelson (2004) defines technological advance as a “collective, cultural, evolutionary process.” p. 
458.  
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confer on later innovators. But the cumulative nature of research poses problems 
for the optimal design of patent law that are not addressed by that perspective. 
The challenge is to reward early innovators fully for the technological foundation 
they provide to later innovators, but to reward later innovators adequately for 
their improvements and new products as well.”87 
 
This intuition is of paramount importance. If innovation resulted from R&D efforts by 
different agents in different times, investing in a certain product development could be 
“efficient even if its expected cost exceed(ed) its value as a stand-alone product.”88 The whole 
would thus be greater than the sum of the parts. Already Nelson (1957) had suggested that 
knowledge can often be an input rather than a final product.89 In the biopharmaceutical 
industry, this phenomenon is particularly acute. Gambardella (1990) and Walsh et al. (2006) 
proposed that the spread of molecular biology, combinatorial chemistry, bioinformatics and 
automated sequencing techniques (all parts of the so called “biotech revolution”) have even 
strengthened the cumulativeness of pharmaceutical knowledge, traditionally relying on a broad 
set of scientific discoveries.  
 
A number of theoretical and empirical studies support this finding. Maskin and Bessen (2009) 
showed that in some industries imitation reduces expected profit for first-innovators, but raises 
the probabilities of follow-on inventions, which in turn improves social welfare.90 In 
particular, the authors focus on the concepts of sequentiality (i.e. the fact that successive 
inventions are de facto built on previous ones) and complementarity (i.e. the fact that each 
researcher undertakes a different “research line”, thus enhancing the overall probability of a 
discovery).91 Their model shows that in a sequential framework stricter patents may actually 
depress innovation. An interesting natural experiment is the one presented by Williams (2010), 
who studied the human genome sequencing process.92 Both a public institution (Human 
Genome Project) and a private firm (Celera) were involved in the genome sequencing, but 
only Celera protected its discoveries with 2 year patents, selling the product to other 
                                                 
87 Scotchmer (1991), p. 30. 
88 Ibidem, p. 31. “The problem of cumulative research is especially acute when the first technology has very little 
value on its own, but is a foundation for valuable second generation technologies. Even with licensing, the first 
innovator might not capture the full social value that it facilitates and may have deficient incentive to invest. This 
is presumably why governments fund basic research.” p. 39. See also Angell (2010) and Orsenigo et al. (2006).  
89 Nelson (1959), p. 732. 
90 See Scotchmer (1991). 
91 Bessen and Maskin (2009), pp. 612-613. 
92 For a general review of the problems linked to genes’ patentability, see Orsi et al. (2006).  
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companies in exchange of royalties.93 The empirical analysis suggests that Celera’s genes, 
protected by IPRs, were 30% less used in following R&D. The recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision on the non-patentability of genes seems therefore reasonable.94  
 
A similar problem is the one addressed by Heller and Eisenberg (1998). A “tragedy of 
anticommons” would occur whenever “a proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream 
may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and 
product development.”95 Granting too many property rights within the same research line is 
likely to create congestion, increasing transaction costs (through patent litigations, license and 
royalties’ agreements). Differently from physical property, where enclosures avoided over-
utilization of common goods, enclosing knowledge is likely to inhibit the “rolling snowball 
mechanism” of innovation.96 It is thus understandable why the Art. 30 of the TRIPs 
Agreement provides for the so-called “research exemption”, that allows to perform research 
on patented matters, without risking to be sued for patent infringement. However, Walsh et al. 
(2006) interviewed a set of university researchers and corporate IP lawyers, and found that – 
although none of the respondents reported “anticommons” episodes – many of them declared 
recur to a number of “working solutions” (such as inventing around, going off-shore or even 
infringing IPRs) in order to climb over patents covering important pieces of knowledge. 
Notwithstanding the legal safeguard, anticommons may still play a role in inhibiting the 
advances of research. 
 
Another institutional critique to patent system comes from Dasgupta and David (1994), who 
argued that upstream patenting may also generate some indirect effects. In fact, differently 
from private research – motivated by profit - scientific knowledge has traditionally been pulled 
by researchers’ self-motivation and by scientific community’s internal reward mechanisms.97 
Orsenigo et al. (2006) underlined the clash between the IPRs regime, grounded on profit, and 
Open Science, based on serendipity and involving “the free dissemination of results […], peer 
review, and rewards tied to recognized contributions to the communal scientific effort.”98 
Chan et al. (2014) suggested that “science that is driven by profit rather than by concern for 
                                                 
93 Celera licensed the information codified in their database for $1-$15 million to private companies and for 
£7,500-$15,000 to university labs. See Walsh et al. (2006), p. 292. 
94 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 12-398.  
95 Ibidem, p. 698. 
96 Dosi and Nelson (1994), p. 167. 
97 Nelson (2004), however, suggested that this distinction shall not lead to an “idealization” of the Republic of 
Science à la Merton. Far from being systematically communitarian, disinterested and universalistic, the scientific 
community is often reported to be opportunistic and self-interested. p. 463. 
98 Orsenigo et al. (2006), p. 416-417. 
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the public good and interest in knowledge is liable to erode public trust in science generally 
and therefore threatens the solidarity of the public science – society relationship.”99 In other 
words, the long term effects of scientists’ motivation “crowding-out” may hinder innovation. 
Nelson (2004) argued that not only upstream science’s patentability has become the norm, but 
universities and research centres have been gradually shifting towards a profit-oriented 
“business model”.100 Moving from these premises, Pavitt (2001) argued that public policy itself 
would be following a similar path:  
 
“Research proposals are expected to identify possible practical as well as scientific 
benefits; higher priority is being given to user involvement (including partial 
funding), universities are being invited to extract more revenue for licensing their 
intellectual property, and substantial public funds are being spent in ‘foresight’ 
exercises designed to create exchange and consensus around future opportunities 
for application. […] Support for basic research in itself is virtually non-existent.”   
 
As panda’s thumb, patents may thus be diverting public research to downstream invention, 
hindering the development of new breakthrough innovations. 
 
In conclusion, far from being a prefect instrument, patents are complex devices, whose 
effectiveness is still to be proved.  Dosi and Stiglitz (2014) summarized the abovementioned 
evidence by proposing some “take-homes”. First of all, IP is a man-made social construct, 
thus imperfect and perfectible. Second, IPRs incentivizing action is based on private returns, 
which may be un-aligned with social welfare. Third, no robust empirical evidence 
demonstrates that stronger IPRs lead to higher innovation rates. Furthermore, IPRs’ 
effectiveness depends on the structure of the industry and of the country they are applied in.  
 
From an evolutionary perspective, and vis-à-vis the empirical evidence, the standard 
neoclassical market failure model – that ultimately justifies the patent system – may look a 
theoretical failure itself.  
 
                                                 
99 Chan et al. (2014), p. 195. 
100 For a complete review of the evolving role of universities in innovation, see Foray and Lissoni (2010). 
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3. Everything you always wanted 
to know about Pharma, but were 
afraid to ask 
 
For a...Spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go down. 
M. Poppins, 1964 
3.1 The Pharma Curse 
 
Ambiguity is a natural feature of all social phenomena. When looking at the biopharmaceutical 
industry, however, ambiguity becomes the only unambiguous fact. Notwithstanding the 
common agreement on the importance of promoting the development of new drugs,101 most 
of the discussions around pharmaceuticals ultimately lie on ideological rather than scientific 
grounds.102  
 
“Perhaps because of the pharmaceutical industry’s hybrid nature, society 
posits for the industry inconsistent standards of behaviour. On some 
occasions, lawmakers and the general public seem to expect pharmaceutical 
firms to behave as if they were community owned, non-profit entities. At 
the same time, the firms’ owners […] always expect the firms to use their 
market power and political muscle to maximize the owners’ wealth. Caught 
between these inconsistent standards of behaviour is an industry that 
naturally will never get it quite right.”103 
 
                                                 
101 Lichtenberg (2005) found a positive correlation between the number of priority drugs approved by the FDA 
and the gains in life expectancy in the U.S.. Kremer (2002) reported that despite the 13% reduction in sub-
Saharan African countries’ GDP per capita, those countries had experienced a 10% life expectancy gain and a 
30% infant mortality reduction between 1972 and 1999. Furthermore, he reported some findings by Jamison et 
al. (2001), suggesting that more than 70% of infant mortality reduction worldwide originated from technological 
progress. Similar results hold for OECD countries: Lichtenberg (2012) found that “the increase in life expectancy 
at birth due to the increase in the fraction of drugs consumed that were launched after 1990 was 1.27 years — 
73% of the actual increase in life expectancy at birth”, p. 18.  
102 Boldrin and Levine (2001). 
103 Reinhardt (2011), p. 137. 
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Only on one thing everyone converges: pharmaceutical industry is different. Not only drugs are 
a uniquely complex product, but market and non-market institutions shaping their production 
processes are distinctively composite.  
3.2 Industry on the Verge of an R&D Productivity Crisis? 
 
At first glance, the biopharmaceutical industry is one of the most innovative in the U.S. In 
2008, pharmaceutical companies devoted 12,2% of their sales to R&D, compared to a general 
industry average of 3% (see Figure 6).104  
 
Figure 6: R&D intensity (R&D/Sales) by industry, 2008 
 
Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, and U.S. Census 
Bureau, Business R&D and Innovation Survey, 2008. 
 
Gambardella (1990), however, highlighted that R&D expenses might be a fallacious proxy of 
innovativeness.105 In fact, looking at the number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved 
– a traditional pharmaceutical R&D output measure – the industry’s innovative performance 
looks far less uncontroversial.106 Figure 7 shows the number of NMEs approved by the FDA 
between 1970 and 2012 (left scale) together with industry and National Institute of Health 
R&D expenditures for the same years (right scale). As suggested by CBO (2006) and 
Mazzucato (2013), Figure 7 shows that, notwithstanding the steep increase in R&D 
                                                 
104 Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, and U.S. Census 
Bureau, Business R&D and Innovation Survey, 2008. 
105 Gambardella (1990), p. 40. 
106  FDA defines NMEs those products “contain(ing) active moieties that have not been approved by FDA 
previously, either as a single ingredient drug or as part of a combination product”. See 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/druginnovation/default.htm 
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expenditures occurred in the last decade (the compounded annual growth rate was 11,2%), the 
number of NMEs discovered has kept stable on average.107 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) 
analysed an alternative measure of R&D productivity, i.e. the number of patents per dollar of 
R&D spending. Consistently with the scenario exemplified by Figure 7, their findings 
suggested that, differently from other industries, the number of patents has declined in the last 
decades without being compensated by any significant increase in patents’ quality.108  
 
Figure 7: Public and Industry R&D spending and NMEs, 1970-2012 
 
Source: Based on PhRMA (http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/PhRMA_2002_p02_07_appendix.pdf), the 
Food and Drug Administration (http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/ 
SummaryofNDAApprovalsReceipts1938tothepresent/default.htm) and the National Science Foundation 
(http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris/search_hist.cfm?indx=10)  
 
Thus, the industry is on the verge (or probably in the middle) of a productivity crisis.  
 
After reviewing the available empirical evidence, Scannell et al. (2012) attributed the decline in 
industry’s R&D productivity to a composite set of determinants. First, the marginal difficulty 
to produce a successful drug would grow exponentially as time passes: the “better than the 
Beatles” problem suggests a comparison between pharma companies and pop singers willing 
to record a successful song in a world where people never get bored with Beatles. In other 
                                                 
107 The number of NMEs may be an imprecise measure of pharmaceutical innovation. In fact, it neglects all new 
formulations of existing products, new uses of approved products, most vaccines and some biological entities, 
that may lead strong benefits to consumers (e.g. by reducing side effects or making the drug easier to take). 
Furthermore, it does not account for the different therapeutic importance of different NMEs. As suggested by 
Scannell et al. (2012): “a few breakthrough drugs – for example, a highly effective Alzheimer’s disease treatment 
– could have a much greater medical and financial value than a larger number of new drugs that provide only 
modest incremental benefits.” 
108 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) created a composite patent quality index, taking into account the number 
of claims, the number of backward and forward citations, and the patent family size. pp.451-454. 
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words, developing successful pharmaceutical breakthrough to compete with existing products 
will be harder as the number of available products increases. Second, the “low-hanging fruit” 
phenomenon may lead companies to exploit easier technological targets first: once all the low-
hanging fruits have been picked, the cost of climbing the tree of knowledge is expected to be 
very high. Third, every time pharmaceutical companies misbehave, regulators would become 
more cautious and impose stricter rules. Fourth, Big Pharma would have been “throwing 
money” in R&D, by increasing the dimension of research teams, without considering the non-
linear influence of human resources availability on final R&D output. Finally, the shift from a 
serendipitous research approach (the random screening, where thousands of molecules were 
tested) towards the “rational drug design”, where – mainly through new expensive genetic 
methods and the DNA sequencing technologies – research is targeted to a precise disease, 
may have increased costs, without improving success rates.109  
 
The abovementioned framework surely captures many interesting trends in biopharmaceutical 
R&D. However, differently from other industries, pharmaceutical innovation is anchored to a 
complex set of internal and external factors that deeply influence its cost structure and the 
direction of R&D.  
3.3 Beyond the product information sheet  
 
The biopharmaceutical industry is generally ungenerous in sharing detailed figures of its R&D 
costs.110 Thus, estimating the industry product’s cost – a usually easy venture, requiring noting 
more than a few additions – becomes in the drug sector a “mission impossible”.  
 
Based on that seminal article by Di Masi et al. (2003), Di Masi and Grabowski (2012) 
identified four drivers of pharmaceutical R&D expenditure (see Figure 8). First of all, 
producing an innovative drug implies a strong component of uncertainty. Di Masi et. al (2003) 
estimated a clinical approval success of 21,5%: only one in five drugs in current pipelines is 
expected to reach the market. Second, development time for new drugs spans over decades: 
according to Di Masi et al. (2003) the process lasts on average 11,8 years. Third, Di Masi and 
                                                 
109 After reviewing the main breakthroughs in pharmaceutical research methods, Scherer (2010) suggested that – 
notwithstanding the new and sophisticated technologies – the overall decree of uncertainty has decrease 
substantially in the last decades, pp. 545-550.  
110 Orsenigo et al. (2006) highlighted that “It would certainly be helpful if drug producers convinced of their 
continuing innovativeness allowed independent researchers to browse through their R&D investment portfolios 
and their product selection strategies.”  
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Grabowski (2003) suggested that pharmaceutical companies are supposed to consider 
opportunity costs in their investment decisions: because of the high technical risk, opportunity 
costs for R&D are expectedly substantial. Finally, throughout the long development process, 
pharmaceutical companies would face production factors’ price increases: Di Masi et al. (2003) 
found that, overall, inflation-adjusted total out-of-pocket costs had been increasing of 7% 
each year between 1979 and 2003.111 
 
Figure 8: NMEs’ cost estimation components 
 
Source: Adapted from Di Masi et al. (2003) 
 
These internal cost drivers, however, are deeply influenced by some external regulatory 
constraints.  
 
Starting from the second half of XX century, most Western governments established 
dedicated agencies to design and manage systematic drug reviews.112 In the U.S., in particular, 
the Food and Drug Administration – originally aimed at controlling food adulteration – 
gradually acquired a central role in reviewing the safety and effectiveness of new 
pharmaceutical products. The economic justification of strong regulation within 
                                                 
111 Di Masi and Grabowski (2012), pp. 27-28. 
112 The main institutional push came from the scandal of Thalidomide, a sedative drug marketed in Europe and 
in Canada between 1959 and 1962. When used by pregnant women, the drug caused severe congenital disorders 
and deformities. In the wake of those events, the U.S. Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FD&C Act), obliging pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate the drug’s safety and effectiveness as a 
marketing approval condition. See Malani and Philipson (2012). 
The cost  
of  a pill 
Technical Risk 
Development 
time 
Cost trends 
Opportunity cost 
43 
 
biopharmaceutical industry is twofold. On the one hand, private profit-maximizing 
organizations would have no interest in producing and disclosing information about their own 
products (information is a public good); and even if they did, they would probably lack the 
necessary expertise and resources to conduct large scale trials. On the other hand, through the 
FDA review process some minimum quality standards are set, in order to protect consumers 
from unsafe drugs.113   
 
Currently, the FDA obliges everyone willing to market a new pharmaceutical product to 
undergo a rigorous path of trials. Once a new molecule has been discovered and tested 
successfully on animals, an Investigational New Drug (IND) application needs to be 
submitted in order to obtain the authorization to test the product on humans. In case of 
positive response, the applicant can start the three-phase clinical testing process. During Phase 
I, the drug is administered to a small group of patients in order to assess if the new product 
can be prescribed at pharmacologically effective doses without provoking relevant side effects. 
Subsequently, the treatment is extended over a broader set of patients to test its effectiveness. 
Finally, Phase III requires at least two large sample randomized trials, and is aimed at 
demonstrating the new drug’s safety and effectiveness.114 If Phase III trials are successful, the 
applicant can submit a New Drug Application (NDA): the FDA reviews the data on the whole 
testing process, and eventually gives the final approval, involving both a marketing 
authorization and an “exclusivity” period - varying from 3 to 7 years – during which the FDA 
may not approve any generic version of the drug.115   
 
The FDA regulation, therefore, impacts final drug development costs, both by increasing the 
length and lowering the success rates of pharmaceutical innovation. However, from a societal 
                                                 
113 Malani and Philipson(2012). Galambos (2006) suggested that “the impact of prescription drugs on mortality 
and morbidity indicate(s) why this particular industry has been singled out in most developed economies for 
extensive controls of efficacy and safety.” 
114 FDA minimum standard requires placebo-controlled trials. See CBO (2006), p. 24. For a general overview of 
the scientific and ethical issues linked to this practice, see Chiodo et al. (2000). Angell (2004) stated that trials can 
be easily disguised, either through actual results manipulation or through sampling design tricks (like including 
only young people to test drugs addressed mainly to the elderly).  
115 Orphan drugs, i.e. drugs that target diseases affecting no more than 200.000 US patients per year are granted 7 
years of market exclusivity. The exclusivity period is decreased to 5 years if the product is a New Chemical or 
Molecular Entity. All other drugs get a 3 year exclusivity period. Paediatric drugs of any kind are also eligible for 
extra 6 months of market exclusivity. Generic versions of already existing products can overcome the clinical 
testing process and submit an Accelerated NDA (ANDA), by demonstrating the bioequivalence between the 
generic product and the correspondent drug on the market. See www.fda.gov. Eisenberg (2012) suggested that 
regulatory exclusivity may be a useful policy device to spur pharmaceutical innovation: differently from patent 
law, anchored to a series of international treaties and agreements, the FDA exclusivity could be easily modified in 
order to take into account the specific characteristics of biopharmaceutical innovation.  
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standpoint, this increase in R&D expenses may well be preferable to a totally un-regulated 
pharmaceutical market. 116  
 
Figure 9: New drugs’ production process 
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      Safety Safety 
    Safety Dosing  Efficacy  
      Efficacy Side Effects 
Expenses   $15,2 million $23,5 million $86,5 million 
Time   21,6 months 25,7 months 30,5 months 
1 to 6 ys. 6 to 11 ys. 0,6 to 2 ys. 11 to 14 ys. 
Overall 
success rate  
30% 14% 9% 8% 
 
Conditional 
success rate 
40% 75% 48% 64% 90% 
 
 
Source: Di Masi et al. (2003). “Overall success rate” is the unconditional probability of reaching a given stage. 
“Conditional success rate” is the probability of advancing to the next stage conditional on reaching a given stage. 
 
Starting from the detailed scheme represented in Figure 9 – depicting the drug production 
process and the authors’ assumptions on each R&D step’s length and success probability - Di 
Masi et al. (2003) concluded that the cost of each NME is of approximately $802 million. This 
figure results from a canonical investment valuation analysis, where cash-flows are capitalized 
to the point at which the investment starts to deliver the first returns, using the weighted 
average cost of capital of the industry (9%) as a capitalization/discount rate. Dividing the final 
capitalized cost by the clinical success rate, Di Masi et al. (2003) obtained a $403 million out-
of-pocket cost and a $399 million opportunity cost.  
 
Although it has quickly become “classical”, this result actually relies on a number of 
controversial methodological and technical assumptions. First of all, Di Masi et al. (2003) used 
a randomly selected set of new drugs developed by ten large multinational pharmaceutical 
                                                 
116 Di Masi et al. (2003) estimated an average trial duration of five years, with FDA review process lasting 18,2 
months on average. Based on their review of the literature, however, Malani and Philispon (2012) suggested that 
the influence of the FDA requirements on the industry’s innovative pace was not easy to assess empirically.  
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companies. CBO (2006) and Di Masi at al. (2003) identified a shift of large pharmaceutical 
companies’ R&D towards chronic diseases, which naturally require longer and more complex 
trials. Adams and Brantner (2006) conducted a detailed analysis of the cost of drugs in 
different therapeutic areas, and found substantial variability, with total costs ranging from 
$454m (for anti-parasitic treatment) to $1,134m (for respiratory disorders).117 Second, Angell 
(2004) questioned the inclusion of opportunity costs in the final calculation: the opportunity 
cost of producing drugs should be a natural component of pharmaceutical enterprise and not 
an additional cost component. Finally, Di Masi et al. (2003) only considered NMEs. Being 
most of the pharmaceutical companies’ efforts directed to the development of modifications 
or improvements of already existing drugs (the so-called “me-too” drugs),118 focusing on the 
small number of innovative molecules may have distorted the final estimate.  
 
CBO (2006) identified a cost increase problem within the industry, and linked it to the general 
trend to undertake a greater number of trials, either to demonstrate the drug’s effectiveness 
compared to existing drugs or to advertise products to the medical community.119 CBO (2006) 
also estimated part of the R&D cost increase to depend on the growth in total R&D 
employment and labour costs (increased respectively of 5,4% and 9,3% every year). Angell 
(2004), on the other hand, questioned the whole reliability of pharmaceutical companies’ self-
reported figures, which would be systematically misrepresented by simple accounting tricks.120 
In fact, the main reason behind the free fall in the biopharmaceutical R&D productivity would 
lie not in the numerator – i.e. the R&D costs – but in the denominator, namely in the number 
and the characteristics of new industry’s products.  
3.4 Of me-too drugs and other demons  
 
Valuing drugs is tremendously complex.121 However, a series of proxies can be useful in 
distinguishing drugs with substantial therapeutic value from others.122 The FDA grants a 
                                                 
117 Adams and Brantner (2006), p. 421. 
118 See Angell (2004), pp. 79-93. Hollis (2004) suggested a useful distinction among purely “me-too” products, 
those who simply replicate an existing drug, and “follow-on” pharmaceuticals, which imply some incremental 
value. p. 1. 
119 The promotional intent is fundamental for the so-called seeding studies, which involve small groups of patients 
in a large number of study sites, without any control group and no or little statistical significance. See Love 
(2003), pp. 22-23. 
120 Angell (2004), pp. 138-150. 
121 See Towse et al. (2012) for a review of pharmacoeconomics’ fundamentals.  
122 Available online at:  
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherapies/u
cm128291.htm. 
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“priority review” – i.e. a quicker review process - to drugs representing a significant advance 
over existing therapies. As shown in Figure 10, the number of priority review NMEs seldom 
exceeded 50% of total NMEs approved. 
 
Figure 10: Priority vs. Standard Review Drugs, 1970-2012 
 
Source: Adapted from CBO (2009), p. 2.  
 
According to Angell (2004), almost 77% of new pharmaceutical products would basically 
replicate the therapeutic effect of existing drugs. CBO (2006) found that in each top selling 
U.S. therapeutic class, the number of me-too drugs varied from 3 to 11. Love (2003) estimated 
that only 2.6% of total sales devoted to R&D in the period 1993-2002 (which amounted to 
12,6%) was actually spent on priority review drugs.123 In fact, according to CBO (2006), two 
thirds of total NDAs regarded either me-too or follow-on drugs, and most of them received a 
standard rating.124 
 
Besides its moral implications, the me-too drugs phenomenon is crucial in order to 
understand some otherwise puzzling figures on the biopharmaceutical industry.  Angell (2004) 
                                                 
123 Boldrin and Levine (2008) reported more than 77% of FDA approved drugs to be “redundant from the 
strictly medical point of view”. Angell (2004) stated that “from 1998 through 2003, 487 drugs were approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Of those, 379 (78%) were classified by the agency as ‘appear[ing] 
to have therapeutic qualities similar to those of one or more already marketed drugs’, and 333 (68%) weren’t even 
new compounds (what the FDA calls “new molecular entities”), but instead were new formulations or 
combinations of old ones. Only 67 (14%) of the 487 were actually new compounds considered likely to be 
improvements over older drugs.” Ibidem, p. 1451. 
124 CBO (2006) found that only 12% of the non-NMEs approved by the FDA over the period 1990-2004 
received “priority review” rating, p. 15. 
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reported that pharmaceutical companies spend 12% of their revenues in R&D and over 30% 
in Marketing and Administration.125 In fact, in a market scenario of increasing product 
duplication and strong asymmetric information, the value of promotion activities becomes 
considerable. From a dynamic standpoint, however, the profitability of small incremental 
modification of pre-existing products sharply reduces incentives to engage in risky innovative 
activities.126 In other words, incentives to innovate would be systematically distorted towards 
less innovative – but more profitable - products. On a global scale, this produces the so called 
“90/10 gap”: most of the dollars spent in pharmaceutical research would target diseases 
affecting 10% of people worldwide, often by duplicating already existing drugs.127 
 
Some scholars, however, argued that me-too drugs are not necessarily bad. Di Masi and 
Paquette (2004) showed that more than half of these allegedly duplicative products (57%) 
were actually granted a “priority” review from the FDA, an index of high therapeutic value. 
Furthermore, Lu and Comanor (1998) found prices’ increase rate for pharmaceuticals to be 
negatively correlated with the number of non-generic substitutes of the first-in-class brand 
drugs: me-too drugs would thus push down medicines’ prices. However, these same results 
still suggest 43% of total me-too drugs to be duplicates of existing products. Furthermore, the 
$802 million figure – if valid – would be misleading, since it is referred to NMEs, an 
apparently small part of total pharmaceutical companies’ product portfolio.  
 
Beside the alleged increase in R&D costs, therefore, the industry seems to be focusing on un-
innovative products. Far from being the result of stricter FDA requirements or industry’s 
technological opportunities’ exhaustion, the decline in the overall productivity may be 
ascribable to the merely profit-maximizing behaviour of pharmaceutical companies, unwilling 
to bear the risk of innovation and preferring to compete in overcrowded but still highly 
profitable quasi-monopolistic markets.128 
 
                                                 
125 Angell (2004) also raised some concerns over the nature of pharmaceutical companies’ promotional 
campaigns, which may occasionally assume the shape of corruption, pp. 110-150. From a welfare economics 
standpoint, the market for pharmaceuticals, characterised by strong asymmetric information and with 
government and insurances substituting consumers in the final payments, is well likely to fail: patients are often 
unable to assess the real value of a new drug, and doctors – the ultimate judges for drug prescription – are usually 
unaware or insensitive to drugs’ prices. See the path-breaking work by Arrow (1963). 
126 See Hollis (2004). 
127 See Davey (2002). For a review of the detrimental effects of IPRs for developing countries , see Siew-Kuan 
NG (2010), Pogge et al. (2010) and Cimoli et al. (2014). 
128 Acemoglu and Linn (2004) found that market size is a strong determinant of R&D expenses, with a 1% 
market size increase generating a 4% increase in R&D expenditures.  
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In fact, notwithstanding the productivity slowdown, Fortune 500 pharmaceutical companies 
continued to report one of the highest returns on assets. In 2009, the Big Pharma’s ROA was 
11,5%, compared to the market average of 4,1%.129 This is coherent with the strong reliance 
of the industry on patents, which systematically grant them monopolistic rents. In fact, 
differently from other sectors,130 the industry quest for stronger patent rights has never 
vacillated. Many scholars however suggested these figures to be imprecise: pharmaceutical 
companies do not capitalize R&D expenses for fiscal reasons,131 and Grabowski and Vernon 
(2000) and Grabowski et al. (2002) found that the Internal Rate of Return of pharmaceutical 
R&D investments does not significantly differ from the industry’s cost of capital.132 Similarly, 
Grabowski and Vernon (2000) and Grabowski et al. (2002) reported that the distribution of 
returns in the pharmaceutical sector to be systematically skewed: the top decile of products 
(the so called “blockbuster” drugs) approximately accounted for 50% of total returns. 
Pharmaceutical industry profit structure would thus involve strong risks, which in turn justify 
high returns.  
 
All things considered, however, the overall picture remains puzzling: low productivity, high 
R&D expenses, and above-average returns driven by the strong industry attachment to patents 
as an appropriability instrument. It is thus unsurprising that, as reported by Boldrin and 
Levine (2008): 
 
“Some people love the pharmaceutical and some people despise it: there is little 
middle ground. The pharmaceutical industry is the poster-child of every 
intellectual monopoly supporter. It is the vivid example that, without the 
sheltering patents provide inventors with, the outpouring of new wonder drugs 
we have grown accustomed to would have not materialized […]. In the opposite 
camp, Big Pharma is the scourge of humanity: a club of oligopolistic white men 
that, by controlling medicine around the globe and refusing to sell drugs at their 
marginal cost, are letting millions of poor people die. Withdrawal of supply by the 
                                                 
129 Source: money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/performers/industries/profits/assets.html 
130 One of the most recent news regards the decision by the CEO of Tesla, an automotive company active in the 
field of electric cars, to share its whole patent portfolio to spur investments in green technologies. See 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelinemaynard/2014/06/12/teslas-elon-musk-take-our-patents-theyre-yours/  
131 The U.S. Congress grants tax credits for R&D expenditure only if they are not capitalized. See Reinhardt 
(2011), p. 143.  
132 See also Di Masi and Grabowski (2012). 
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Big Pharmaceuticals is as close to economic crime as anything can be, we are 
told.”133  
3.5 The U.S. biopharmaceutical innovation system 
 
In the last four decades, the U.S. have been devoting an average 3% of their Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) to R&D activities, one of the highest shares of all OECD countries.134 The 
latest National Science Foundation (NSF) statistics show that in 2011 the U.S. spent 2,8% of 
their GDP in R&D, 40% of which came from the federal government, universities and other 
government and non-profit institutions (see Figure 11). A similar breakdown characterized 
R&D activities’ performers.  
 
Figure 11: Total U.S. R&D spending by funding source, 2011 
 
Source: National Science Foundation 
 
In fact, Block (2011) highlighted that, notwithstanding the strong market fundamentalist 
rhetoric, public intervention has been a constant through U.S. history. Starting from World 
War II and throughout the whole Cold War period, the U.S. federal government systematically 
promoted innovation via publicly funded labs, research programs or agencies. Military targeted 
research, in particular, is reported to be the first mover in the development of several 
                                                 
133 Boldrin and Levine (2008), Ch. 9, p. 2. 
134 OECD reports that in 2010, the countries devoting the largest  share of their GPD to R&D expenses were 
Israel (4,3%), Finland (3,9%), Korea (3,7%), Sweden (3,4%), Japan (3,2%), Denmark (3%), United States (2,8%). 
See http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/gross-domestic-expenditure-on-r-d_2075843x-table1 
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technologies that ultimately originated several successful consumer products.135 Programs such 
as DARPA (the “Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency”), SBIR (the “Small Business 
Innovation Research” Programme) and the more recent NNI (“National Nanotechnology 
Initiative”) delivered technological breakthroughs in several areas, supporting the creation of 
new products from basic research to final development.136 Bell (1973) had predicted that, 
because of the increasing importance of knowledge in contemporary societies, science would 
have gradually acquired a central role within national innovation systems. In turn, the 
government – as the main supplier of scientific knowledge – would have played an always 
broader role. 
 
“It seems clear […] that, today, in America we are moving away from a society 
based on a private-enterprise market system towards one in which the most 
important economic decisions will be made at the political level, in terms of 
consciously define ‘goals’ and ‘priorities’.”137  
 
On the other hand, the U.S. have been traditionally pointed as one of the most fervent 
supporter of IPRs: the current international legal architecture on intellectual property, the 
World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPs), is almost totally modelled on the U.S. system.138  
 
This apparent contradiction is particularly sharp with regard to the U.S. biopharmaceutical 
industry. PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America), the association 
gathering the biggest U.S. bio-pharmaceutical companies – notwithstanding the disappointing 
innovative industry performance - constantly campaigns in favor of stronger intellectual 
property rights, supposed to be the main driver of private R&D investments. Simultaneously, 
even throughout the financial crisis years, the U.S. government’s financial support to the 
sector has not decreased. Today, the federal government devotes 20% of its budget to 
pharmaceutical R&D: in turn, this sum represents a substantial share (27%) of the total 
amount of dollars spent on biomedical research every year (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).139 
 
 
                                                 
135 See Block (2011) and Mazzucato (2012). Mazzucato, loc. cit., showed that most of the technologies behind 
Apple’s best seller products had been originally developed by the Department of Defence. 
136 Ibidem. 
137 Bell (1973), pp. 297-298. 
138 See Stiglitz (2008). 
139 See Nicholson (2012). 
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Figure 12: Federal Budget by Department, 2010 
 
Source: National Science Foundation, 2011  
 
Figure 13: Biomedical R&D by funding source, 2008 
 
Source: Adapted from Nicholson (2012) 
 
 
In fact, from a theoretic standpoint, the case for public intervention in the biopharmaceutical 
sector is particularly strong. Both Gambardella’s (1990) and Orsenigo and Malerba’s (2000) 
frameworks, presented in Chapter 1, highlight the industry’s peculiar characteristics. In fact, 
biopharmaceutical technical change relies heavily on scientific knowledge’s advances, with 
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technology and science being very deeply interwoven. In this context, appropriability levels are 
likely to be low and the degree of cumulativeness high. Moreover, drugs are a generally un-
complex and divisible product and, as suggested by Arrow (1963), the role of final consumers 
in the medical domain is expected to be minimal, due to strong asymmetric information and 
to the peculiar agency relationship between patients and physicians.140  
 
In addition, the industry experienced great structural and technological shifts in the last few 
decades, which probably even increased the pervasiveness of government intervention. 
Gambardella (1990) divided the history of modern biopharmaceuticals in two eras: before the 
1990s, the main paradigm was the “chemical” one, with discoveries guided by the 
serendipitous “random screening” of chemical compounds. After the introduction of 
biotechnologies (particularly in the areas of DNA sequencing, cellular fusions and bio-
processes engineering) the R&D process evolved and became more “rational” and targeted, 
thanks to the advent of several innovative research tools and procedures. Genetics and 
molecular biology acquired increasing weight within the overall R&D processes and 
dramatically reduced the distance between science and the market. In fact, similarly to the case 
of DNA organisms for the production of insulin – that allowed the production of human 
insulin through recombining DNA - many apparently upstream discoveries were immediately 
translatable in marketable products.  
 
Powell et al. (2005) argued that in this new context, biopharmaceutical companies found 
“hierarchy” models ineffective. Rather than vertically integrating all the competencies involved 
in knowledge creation, they would have preferred to “embed” themselves in a larger system 
gravitating around universities. Institutional and legal devices such as partnership agreements, 
alliances, outsourcing of clinical trials, IP licensing or direct corporate investment in academic 
programs, played the role of a “glue” to sustain this newborn complex innovation systems. 
The biotech revolution thus completely reshaped the industry’s competitive scenario: 
universities and small biotech companies (often university spin-offs themselves) acquired a 
pivotal role in the knowledge production chain. Publicly funded laboratories and large 
corporations, on the contrary, apparently lost their centrality. Meanwhile, the government 
continued to support pharmaceutical R&D through new and more diversified instruments, 
                                                 
140 Coehn at al. (2002) found the same result, suggesting that consumer’s feedback was the most relevant input 
for innovation investments in all U.S. industry sectors, with the exception of pharmaceutical and chemical 
companies.  
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and large corporations concentrated on commercialization and distribution of new drugs, 
delegating most of the research work to academic and small business organizations.  
 
What was the first engine of this paradigm shift? According to Vallas et al. (2011), neither the 
invisible hand of the market or the visible hand of the Big Pharma. The “biotech” revolution 
would have been the planned result of a precise series of institutional measures realized by the 
federal government. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act enabled universities and non-profit 
organizations to patent publicly funded discoveries; the Stevenson-Wydler Act (1980) 
authorised Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and provided 
federal institutions with dedicated Technological Transfer Offices (TTOs); the Small Business 
Innovation Development Act and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program 
introduced drastic and systemic incentives for small biotech to flourish;141 finally, the Orphan 
Drug Act (ODA), that grants extended patent protection and substantial tax credits for 
companies producing drugs for rare diseases, ensured the newborn sector with a considerable 
flow of revenues.  
3.6 Public and private roles in biopharma 
 
A whole stream of literature has thus investigated the role of the U.S. public and academic 
institutions in the development of new pharmaceutical products. Mansfield (1998) found that 
31% of new drugs produced between 1986 and 1994 could not have been developed without 
substantial delay without the contribution of academic research, and 13% of them received 
significant aid from academic research. Toole (1999) reported that public basic research 
stimulates private R&D investment, after a 6-8 years lag, with an estimated elasticity of R&D 
to public research of 0.46 to 0.53, thus suggesting a strong complementarity between public 
and private research. Cockburn and Handersen (1996) analysed a sample of fifteen drugs, and 
found that public contribution had been fundamental in the upstream research for the 
development of all of them. Interviews to corporate and publicly-employed scientists, 
furthermore, suggested that the public sector was pivotal in expanding the breadth of 
scientific knowledge and in improving the research process quality through substantial 
spillovers.  
 
                                                 
141 The SBIR, in particular, requires federal agencies to devote at least 2,5% of their budget to support firms with 
less than 500 employees. In 2004, the SBIR granted $2 bn to U.S. small enterprises.  
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Vallas et al. (2011) conducted an interesting exercise to drive the government’s hand out of 
the shadows. In particular, they retraced the history of the 2006 blockbuster drugs (i.e. those 
generating revenues for more than $1 million in 2006). Of the fifteen drugs identified, only 
two had received little or no federal support. Eight products had been the result of original 
efforts of the National Institute of Health (NIH) and other academic institutions, and five of 
them received substantial public support during the trial phase – the one pointed by 
pharmaceutical companies as the greatest R&D cost-driver.142  
 
The case of Cerezyme is emblematic. In 1983, NIH scientists synthesized the enzyme curing 
Gaucher’s disease. Genyzeme was a company funded by Tufts University academics who had 
been part of the Gaucher’s disease NIH research group. Using provisions from the ODA, 
Genyzyme obtained exclusive rights on Cerezyme and commercialized it at an annual price of 
$350,000 per patient. When the Congress asked the Federal Office of Technology Assessment 
to trace how many public dollars that had been devoted to the drug development, they found 
that NIH had not kept any information on its investments.  
 
None of the fifteen top selling drugs’ patents, moreover, had been assigned to public 
organizations. Private corporations apparently obtained the ownership of final innovations, 
that had resulted from the joint efforts of a myriad of actors, all sustained by the strong role of 
the government. In fact, according to Vallas et al. (2011), patent policy has been one of the 
most pervasive measures of the broader federal effort to develop a strong biotechnological 
industry: not only provisions such as the Bayh-Dole Act or the ODA are meant to favour 
private investment in the sector, but the trend in court decisions – starting from the 
controversial Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that allowed genetically modified organisms’ patentability 
– strongly supported newborn biotech companies. 
                                                 
142 See Di Masi et al. (2003).  
Table 2: Federal contribution to 2006 blockbuster drugs’ development  
 
 
 
 
           Source: Vallas et al. (2005), p. 67. 
 
 
Product Company
2006 sales 
($bn) Indication Role of Federal Support
Significant Federal Support for Drug Discovery, Development and Clinical Trials
Epogen, Procrit, Eprex Amgen, Kirin, J&J $6,10 Anemia NIH funding leads to patent at Columbia Univeristy
Enbrel Amgen, Wyeth, Takeda $4,40 Rheumatoid Arthritis NIH funding leads to patent at SW Texas Medical Center
Neupogen Amgen, Kirin, J&J $4,00 Neutropenia NIH research for initial development (NIH licensed patent rights)
Rituxan Biogen, Idec, Genetech, Roche $3,90 Non-Hodgkins LymphomaNIH (SBIR) funding, leading to IPO of Idec (now Biogen-Idec)
Remicade J&J, Schering-Plough, Tanabe $3,60 Crohn's disease NIH funding for research at NYU
Avonex Biogen Idec $1,70 MS, Arthritis NIH funding and market protection under Oprhan Drug Act
Syagis Medimmune $1,10 RSV infection NIH research , plus extensive SBIR funding
Cerezyme Genzyme $1,00 Gaucher's disease NIH research, plus market protection under Orphan Drug Act
Significant Federal Support for Clinical Trials
Herceptin Genetech, Roche $3,10 Breast cancer Corporate support (Revlon) for research; federal support for testing
Avastin Genetech, Roche $2,40 Cancer Corporate support for development; significant federal spport for clinical testing
Humira Abbott $2,00 Autoimmune diseases Limited federal support for developmetn; significant federal support for clinical testing
Humalog Eli Lilly $1,30 Diabetes Limited federal support for developmetn; extensive federal support for clinical testing
Betaseron Bayer Schering $1,20 Multiple Sclerosis Federal support for testing; merket protection under Orphan Drg Act
Little or No Federal Support
Aranesp Amgen $4,10 Anemia Modification of Epogen to gain patent approval
Erbitux ImCLone, Bristol-Myers, Merck, KGaA $1,10 Cancer No evidence of federal support found 
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Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) analysed public and private contribution to the development of NMEs 
approved by the FDA between 1988 and 2005. Their results showed that, even if the actual number of 
patents granted to public organization was quite low (9%), the indirect contribution of the government 
was much higher. In fact, the share of patents citing at least one public-sector or government 
publication was on average 47,8%, reaching 64,5% for priority-review drugs, those of greater 
therapeutic value. Furthermore, looking at patent citations, they reported that patents associated to 
priority-review drugs cited more public patents and scientific research, suggesting a stronger role of the 
government in developing innovation with the highest therapeutic value.  
 
Table 3: New Drugs produced with direct or indirect public support approved by the FDA, 1988–2005 
 
Source: Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011). 
 
In the new innovation system, the dream-company is the one that starts up as an academic spin-off of 
academics exploiting a publicly-funded discovery and is then supported by venture capital or 
government in the long trial path, so to finally licence the ready-to-market product to large 
pharmaceutical companies.153 In this context it is not surprising to find that the public hand is only 
slightly distinguishable, beyond the dense network of licensing agreements and formal (and informal) 
partnerships that systematically shift innovations’ ownership from public to private actors.154 Measuring 
the absolute contribution of government’s investment to biopharmaceutical innovation is thus a hard 
enterprise. Analysing its characteristics relatively to corporate actors, however, may be a less ambitious but 
more feasible endeavour.  
                                                 
153 See Vallas et al. (2011). 
154 As argued by Czarnitzky (2011), “a major channel of knowledge transfer from science to business takes place through 
consulting and other forms of collaborative research in between academics and firms that become visible in co-invented 
patents assigned to the private sector.” 
Standard-review 
drugs
Priority-review 
drugs
All drugs
Number of drugs 224 155 379
Had public-sector patent 3,1% 17,4% 9,0%
Patent cited either a public-sector patent 
or a government publication 36,2% 64,5% 47,8%
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
“To write it, it took three months;  
to conceive it, three minutes;  
to collect the data in it, all my life.” 
 
F. S. Fitzgerald, 1920 
4.1 Patent value and characteristics 
 
Alongside their economic role, patents are also an important information source. In particular, 
patent citations have been gaining increasing popularity among economists and policy-analysts 
as a handy instrument to assess the value, the characteristics and the directions of innovation. 
In fact, similarly to academic papers, patents include a section that collects the references to all 
patent and non-patent documents that contributed to the invention production. Differently 
from scientific papers’, however, patent citations are subject to a precise regulation. According 
to the U.S. patent law, in fact, anyone applying for patent protection must disclose under the 
shape of citations all the  prior art, i.e. “the knowledge that existed prior to the relevant filing or 
priority date of a patent application”.155 This legal requirement, also referred to as “duty of 
candor”, is supported by the USPTO review process structure: the patent office examiners 
carefully analyse the citations included by the applicant, and have the right to integrate them if 
incomplete. The ultimate goal of patent citations is thus pivotal for the whole IPRs regulation: 
not only they determine the invention’s patentability, but they also delimit the scope of the 
granted property rights.156 Because of this pervasive regulation, patent citations are regarded as 
a very reliable information source. 
 
Besides their legal function, starting from the seminal works of Griliches (1990) and 
Trajtenberg (2002 [1990]), patent citations have been also regarded as a good proxy for patent 
value.157 From an evolutionary standpoint – considering technical change as a cumulative 
process – the value of any innovation is well approximated by its influence on future 
innovations, measured as the number of citations received in later patents. Studying the case 
of Computed Tomography Scanners, Trajtenberg (2002 [1990]) found a robust positive 
                                                 
155 WIPO (2004), p. 19. 
156 See Campbell and Nieves (1979). The self-reported list of citations is checked by USPTO examiners, who can 
integrate and adjust it.  
157 See, among the others, Albert et al. (1991), Harhoff et al. (1999), Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), Hall et al. (2005), 
Van Zeebroeck (2011). 
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relation between the number of forward citations and the actual product’s market value. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) reported a significant positive correlation between the same 
number and the probability for a patent to be subject to litigation, another commonly used 
patent quality proxy.158 Harhoff et al. (1999) analysed the relationship between patent citations 
and the payment of patent renewal fees, while Hall et al. (2005) found patent citations and 
firm market value to be positively correlated. Finally, Sterzi (2013) highlighted that forward 
citations may be a particularly useful device to evaluate public and academic patents: because 
of their intrinsic goals, inspired to the Open Science paradigm, the ability to generate positive 
spillovers seems crucial in assessing publicly funded innovation value.  
 
At the same time, patent citation analysis is not a panacea. In fact, it encompasses a number of 
technical criticalities. First of all, the distribution of forward citations is truncated. This may 
lead to overestimate the value of older patents, which might have collected a larger number of 
citations simply because of the mere passage of time. Hall et al. (2001) found that patents 
issued in 1975 received only 50% of their forward citations in the 10 years following the 
application date. Trajtenberg (2002 [1990]), however, showed that the number of missing 
citations due to the truncation bias is small enough - in absolute terms - not to compromise 
the statistical analyses based on citation counts. Furthermore, Czarnitzky (2011) found no 
statistically significant difference between citation lags of academic and non-academic patents; 
this, in turn, may justify the use of patent citations in comparative analyses. Second, patent 
citations may themselves be a fallacious indicator of patent value, since they may result from 
the inventor’s strategic behaviour rather than from her sincere disclosure of all the knowledge 
underlying the patented innovation. Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011), in particular, suggested 
that strategic citation practices may be more likely to occur in the private sector and could 
thus lead to systematically underestimate the role of government research.  
 
Among all technological classes, biopharmaceutical patents have always attracted the attention 
of researchers because of their peculiar characteristics. Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) 
suggested that in the drug sector strategic behaviours are more unlikely to occur. Hall et al. 
(2001), on the other hand, reported pharmaceutical patents to receive a greater number of 
forward citations, compared to other industrial sectors. (see Table 4).  
 
 
                                                 
158 This is based on the assumption that litigation is more likely to occur for inventions of greater value. 
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Table 4: Citations received by technological category  
 
 
 
Together with the forward citations (      ), backward citations (       ) have also 
been reported to deliver some interesting information on patent characteristics. Therefore, a 
number of indicators have been developed to capture some different dimensions of patent 
quality. Trajtenberg (2002 [1990]), in particular, argued that the basicness of a patent would 
result from the combination of both its backward and forward citations’ structure. In Figure 
14, green circles indicate the originating patents backward citations,        , while red ones 
identify forward citations,          
 
Figure 14: A representation of patent citations’ structure 
 
 
First of all, patents citing previous patents that belong to a broader range of technological 
classes are expected to rely on knowledge coming from different areas.  
 
Average number of forward citations per patent, 1967-1997
Chemical 4,62
Computers & Comm. 6,44
Drugs & Medical 5,99
Elect. & Electronics 4,75
Mechanical 4,17
Others 4,46
Average 5,07
Source: Hall et al. (2001)
1 32
1 32 4
Tech. Class 1 Tech. Class 2 Tech. Class 3 Tech. Class 4
Backward cites 
(nciting)
Originating 
patent
Forward cites 
(ncited)
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            measures the dispersion of backward citations among technological classes, 
by computing the Herfindahl index of concentration on USPTO 3-digit technological classes: 
  
                 
         
        
 
 
  
   
   
 
where  
         
        
  denotes the percentage of citations made by patent   in each technological 
class  , out of     total patent classes. Following the example represented in Figure ???, our 
originating patent would thus have an originality index of: 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
In fact, among its backward citations, two belong to the same class (Class 3) and one to a 
different class (Class 2). 
 
Forward citations, on the other hand, are useful in order to assess the actual impact of any 
innovation on subsequent research: patents with greater value are expected to produce 
spillovers across a large number of technological fields, rather than being concentrated in only 
few of them. Similarly to           ,            measures patent forward citations’ 
dispersion over different technological classes.  
 
                
        
       
 
 
  
   
   
 
Referring again to Figure???, we would thus have: 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
           is therefore higher than           : in fact, as shown in Figure ???, 
forward citations are less concentrated than backward ones. Hall et al. (2001) highlighted that 
biopharmaceutical patents tend to be, on average, less original and general than patents 
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belonging to other technological classes. This result is coherent with the low industry’s 
product complexity, discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
                  and             are thus the common indicators for patent 
analysis:         is often used as a proxy of the absolute value of a patent, while 
           and             measure its characteristics and relationships with past 
and future research.  
4. 2 Data  
 
Our goal here is to assess the characteristics of public and private innovation in the 
biopharmaceutical sector. The linear model of innovation predicts that the public hand would 
be more active in basic research, with private corporations intervening in the downstream part 
of the R&D process.159 Recent evidence reviewed in Chapter 3, however, suggests that – at 
least in the U.S. – government’s hand expands far beyond basic research, permeating 
innovation systems with extensive financial and strategic assistance.160 Since, as suggested by 
Vallas et al. (2011), patent analysis in the biopharmaceutical industry is likely to underestimate 
the public and academic role because of the thick network of licensing and cooperative 
research agreements, we conduct our empirical work on two different datasets. 
 
In the following pages – based on the assumption that our first dataset is more likely, because 
of the characteristics described below, to unveil the public hand - we name it “Alfred”. On the 
other hand, since we expect the public role to be much more invisible there, we refer to 
Sampat and Lichtenberg’s (2011) dataset as “Adam”.  
 
4.2.1 “Alfred”: USPTO Class 514 Cross-Reference Art Collections  
 
Our first dataset includes 15,152 biopharmaceutical patents. During the USPTO examination 
process, each patent is assigned a numerical identifier that indicates its technological class. 
USPTO technological classes are mutually exclusive and each class is exhaustive of the subject 
matter provided for in its definition. Classes 424 and 514 include all patents regarding “Drug, 
                                                 
159 See Nelson (1962). 
160 See Block (2011). 
62 
 
Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions”.161 Beside the standard classification system, 
the USPTO may also provide some Cross-Reference Art Collections, aimed at simplifying 
research within USPTO databases, despite having no official classification value.162 As for 
class 514, Cross-Reference Art Collections 514.810-935 group a set of biopharmaceutical 
products with a declared therapeutic area of application (see Table 5).163 We thus focused on 
those Cross-Reference Art Collections, and extracted the correspondent patent numbers from 
the USPTO database. We are aware that our data selection process may be problematic: in 
fact, by considering only the Cross-Reference Art Collections we may have neglected 
important pharmaceutical patents (cancer drugs, for instance, are excluded from the list of 
subclasses considered here). On the other hand, however, this strategy provided us with each 
patent’s final therapeutic application; this information is particularly valuable to assess if public 
and private hands are focusing on different research areas.  
 
In order to collect data on patents’ characteristics, we matched our list of patents with the 
NBER patent database. The NBER database is one of the most extensive collections of patent 
data, and includes information for all patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 and 
2006.164 In particular, it reports detailed data on patent assignees, number of claims, number of 
citations, originality and generality. We thus excluded from our original dataset all patents 
assigned before 1976 and after 2006; this fact may also be ultimately useful in decreasing the 
risk of truncation bias, more likely to occur in recent patents’ analysis. PATSTAT database 
provided us with the information on inventive teams and non patent literature.  
                                                 
161 Previous research found that, 83% of patents associated with products from U.S. major pharmaceutical 
companies were recorded in USPTO classes 514 (71%) and 424 (29%). Online at: 
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/4/2/3/2/pages242324/p242324-1.php. 
162 USPTO (2012), p. I-7. 
163 Source: http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc514/sched514.htm. 
164 See Hall et al. (2001). See also: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads/patn-data-
description. 
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Table 5: USPTO Cross-Related Art Collections 514.810-935 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: USPTO at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc514/sched514.htm 
 
Subclass Disclosed Disease Condition and Pharmaceutical Effect Subclass Disclosed Disease Condition and Pharmaceutical Effect
810 ADDICTION 874 ESTROGENIC AGENT (NONCONTRACEPTIVE)
811 Alcohol 875 FLEA CONTROL
812 Narcotic 876 Collar type
813 Tobacco 877 GALLSTONE
814 ANEMIA 878 GERIATRICS
815 Sickle cell 879 Senility
816 ANESTHETIC, GENERAL 880 HAIR TREATMENT (THERAPEUTIC-SCALP)
817 ANESTHETIC, TOPICAL 881 Shampoo
818 ANESTHETIC, LOCAL 882 HEMORRHOID PREPARATION
819 ANTACID, ORAL 883 HODGKIN"S DISEASE
821 ANTIARRHYTHMIC 884 HYPOGLYCEMIA
822 ANTICOAGULATION 885 IMMUNE RESPONSE AFFECTING DRUG
823 ANTIDOTE 886 INFLAMMATION, SKIN
824 ARTERIOSCLEROSIS 887 Topical treatment
825 ARTHRITIS 888 INFLUENZA
826 ASTHMA 889 INTERFERON INDUCER
827 ASTRINGENT, NONFACIAL 890 IRRITANT (E.G., TEAR GAS, ETC.)
828 Topical for the skin 891 KIDNEY STONE
829 BITE OR STING 892 LAXATIVE
830 Insect 893 LIVER DISORDER
831 Animal (nonpoisonous) 894 Hepatitis
832 BLOOD SUBSTITUTE 895 MALARIA
833 BLOOD PLASMA EXTENDER 896 MEASLES
834 COAGULANT 897 Rubella
835 CARIES 898 MENINGITIS
836 CHELATE 899 MENSTRUAL DISORDER
837 CHOLERA      MOUTH TREATMENT
838 CIRRHOSIS 900 Periodontitis
839 CONTACT LENS TREATMENT 901 Mouthwash
840 CHEMICAL STERILIZING 902 Gingival
841 CONTRACEPTIVE 903 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS
842 Nonmammal 904 MULTIPLE VITAMINS
843 Female (mammal) 905 With mineral
844 COSMETIC, FACIAL 906 MUSCLE RELAXANT
845 Liquid make-up 907 MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY
846 Cleansing cream or lotion 908 LEUKEMIA
847 Facial moisturizer 909 OBESITY
848 Facial astringent 910 Anorectic
849 COUGH AND COLD PREPARATION 911 Bulking agent
850 Antitussive 912 OPHTHALMIC
851 CYSTIC FIBROSIS 913 Glaucoma
852 DANDRUFF 914 Inflammation
853 DECONGESTANT 915 Wetting agent
854 Vasoconstrictor 916 PYRETIC
855 Expectorant 917 RADIOACTIVE, ANTI-
     DERMATITIS 918 REPELLENT
858 Athlete"s foot 919 Insect
859 Acne 920 Mammal
860 Cellulitis 921 SHOCK
861 Eczema 922 SIDE EFFECT REDUCTION BY INCORP. OF A SECOND DESIGN. INGR.
862 Poison (ivy, oak, sumac) 923 SLEEP AID (INSOMNIA)
863 Psoriasis 924 TUBERCULOSIS
864 Seborrhea 925 ULCER TREATMENT
865 Diaper rash 926 Duodenal
866 DIABETES 927 Peptic
867 DIARRHEA 928 Topical
868 DISTEMPER 929 VASODILATOR
869 DIURETIC 930 VASOCONSTRICTOR (NONDECONGESTANT)
870 EDEMA 931 VENEREAL DISEASE
871 Topical 932 Gonorrhea
872 EMESIS (MOTION SICKNESS-NAUSEA) 933 Syphilis
873 EMOLLIENT 934 Virus
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A crucial part of our analysis consisted in classifying patents according to their owners’ 
nature.165 The NBER database includes a detailed assignee description, that was a useful 
starting point (see Figure ???). In addition, following Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011), we 
collected information on government interest acknowledgement: according to U.S. law, all 
applicants who received support from the federal government must disclose it in a dedicated 
field of the patent document. The USPTO provides a dedicated research field in its 
“Advanced Search” engine for patent with government interest acknowledgement (“    ”). 
Since the provision only applies to U.S. government support, we searched among our classes 
of interest all the patents that included in the dedicated patent document field a textual 
reference to the largest public biopharmaceutical R&D sources.166 Unfortunately, a similar 
exercise was impossible for foreign governments’ financing. However, since sixty-five percent 
of our patents were assigned to U.S. residents (see Figure ???), considering the “government 
interest acknowledgement” was still a helpful integration for our dataset. We thus proceeded 
to build three different dummy variables. The first one,       , takes the value 1 if at least 
one of the patent assignees belongs to NBER “cod” classes 6-15 (see Figure 15) or if the 
patent includes a government interest acknowledgement.167 The decision to label university 
patents as public has a twofold justification: first, universities are the highest recipient of 
federal funding for R&D; second, academic research – similarly to publicly funded one – is 
expected to follow an Open-Science paradigm, and thus focus on pursuing scientific advances 
rather than short-term profits.168 In order to account for the possible specificities of academic 
patents, we built two more dummies –           and                        – 
identifying private, academic and other public (non academic) patents.  
                                                 
165 In particular, NBER provides two assignee identifier variables:     (2-15, see Figure ???) and         
(distinguishing patents granted to U. S. non-government organizations, Non-U. S. non-government 
organizations, Unassigned, U. S. Federal Government, U. S. individuals, Non-U. S. individuals and Non-U. S. 
Governments). 
166  In particular, we searched for all patents where the words “NIH”, “United States”, “Federal”, “U.S.”, 
“government”, “National” were reported under the “Government Interest Acknowledgement” field. See 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm. 
167 517 patents included two or more assignees.  
168 For a review of the debate on the “privatization” of academic research, see Chapter 2. 
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Figure 15: NBER “cod” classification and our ownership variables’ construction 
  Assignee (NBER “cod” classification)   
Non-Public 
U.S. corporation  
Non-Public 
Foreign corporation, including state-owned  
U.S. individual  
Foreign individual  
Public 
U.S. government  
Public  
(non university) 
Foreign government  
U.S. local government  
U.S. state government  
U.S. institute  
Foreign institute  
U.S. hospital or medical institute  
Foreign hospital or med institute  
U.S. university  
University 
Foreign university  
 
Source: adapted from Hall et al. (2001) 
 
4.2.2. “Adam”: Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) 
 
Our second dataset was provided by Prof. Bhaven Sampat of Columbia University. In their 
article, Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) used a complete dataset of the patents associated with 
all New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by the FDA between 1988 and 2005.169 Using 
data from the Drugs@FDA database,170 the authors identified a sample of 478 newly 
approved drugs; the FDA’s Orange Book provided them with the details about patents 
associated to each NME.171 In particular, 379 NMEs reported at least one patent in their FDA 
application folders. The final dataset included 1,043 patent records, with a set of dummy 
variables identifying priority review (    ), HIV (   ) and orphan (      ) drugs.172 
Furthermore, the authors catalogued as    all patents containing a government interest 
acknowledgement or a reference to federally funded research among patent and non patent 
citations. In this way, Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) were able to identify both direct and 
indirect federal investments’ influence on innovation. For homogeneity goals, we treated     
                                                 
169 See Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011). 
170 Drugs@FDA, Available online at: http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/. 
171 FDA’s “Orange book: approved drug products with therapeutic equivalence evaluations”. Available online at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm. 
172 A drug receives “priority review” from the FDA if it represents a substantial improvement over available 
products in the same therapeutic area. According to U.S. Law, orphan drugs are those targeting diseases that 
affect no more than 200.000 U.S. patients per year. 
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as a proxy of      and thus catalogued as        all those inventions that either belonged 
to public or academic assignees or reported a positive value of the dummy    . We 
integrated the dataset following the process described for “Alfred” by using the NBER and 
PATSTAT databases. Of the fifty-three Sampat and Lichtenberg’s (2011)     patents, only 
thirty-eight had been assigned to public or academic institutions: thirty percent of publicly 
funded patents had been therefore ultimately assigned to private organizations.  
 
4.2.3 A first comparison 
 
Both datasets present some specificities and limitations. As anticipated, the first dataset relies 
on USPTO Class 514 Cross-Reference Art Collections: this choice necessarily narrows its 
scope, excluding all patents that do not include a reference to the therapeutic area of interest. 
Sampat and Lichtenberg’s (2011) dataset, on the other hand, is based on the FDA “Orange 
Book”, collecting only approved drugs with therapeutic equivalence. As highlighted by the 
authors, most biotech drugs – where the role of publicly funded research is usually more 
pervasive – are therefore neglected in the Orange Book. Furthermore, by limiting their 
analysis to patents directly associated with NMEs, Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) may have 
considered patents that are closer to the market – i.e. that protect downstream innovations. 
Again, the role of public institutions may be underestimated because of the prevalent role of 
large pharmaceutical corporations in the final stages of drug development.  
 
The two datasets are also heterogeneous in terms of the number of patents included: “Alfred” 
includes 15,152 records, while “Adam” total patents are 1,043. Although any hypothesis on 
the representativeness of our samples looks hazardous, “Adam” may be unbalanced in favour 
of breakthrough innovations (those generating NMEs) that, as shown in Chapter 3, are 
actually a small portion of the overall sector’s R&D. On the one hand, this may focus the 
analysis on the most therapeutically valid products; on the other hand, however, it may lead to 
neglect upstream or incremental innovations that, although not being immediately marketable, 
may still be fundamental for the overall R&D process. 
4.3 Methods  
 
In order to capture the possible divergences in publicly and privately funded 
biopharmaceutical research, we develop a two-stage analysis based on the three main proxies 
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of patent quality:       ,            and            . First, we use the variable 
       to assess whether any difference exists between non-public and public (including 
university) patents. Subsequently, in order to compare more precisely the quality of patents 
assigned to academic, public (but non-academic) and private organization, we include the 
dummies            and                       as explanatory variables. In this 
way, we estimate separately the difference between university and private patents, and the one 
between public (but non-university) and private patents. Since patents with a longer life may 
receive more citations because of the mere passage of time, we add fixed effects for the 
application year in all regressions. 
 
The number of forward citations,      , includes only positive integers. Count models 
effectively deal with such variables. Among them, Poisson models have been traditionally 
regarded as the “gold standard” of patent citation analysis.173 The standard maximum 
likelihood Poisson regression, however, assumes equidispersion (i.e. that the mean is equal to 
the variance). In case of overdispersed distributions such as the one of patent citations, 
therefore, negative binomial models are generally reported to be more appropriate.174 
However, according to Czarnitzky (2011), because of their stronger distributional assumptions 
vis-à-vis Poisson models, negative binomial analysis may ultimately underestimate standard 
errors. We thus conduct a Poisson quasi-maximum-likelihood (QML) regression, i.e. Poisson 
with fully robust standard errors. In particular, we use the STATA command xtpqml, 
developed by Simcoe (2008). 
 
Our second set of dependent variables includes            and            . As 
discussed above, they are both indicators assuming value 0 in case of absolute concentration 
of forward/backward citations in one class and 1 otherwise. Papke and Woolridge (1996) 
developed a fully robust quasi-likelihood method to analyse fractional dependent variables, i.e. 
those variables – such as ours – that only take values ranging from 0 to 1. Therefore, we use a 
fractional logit model to analyse the differences in patents’            and 
           . 
 
The specification of our baseline regression follows the main literature in the field. Each 
regression is firstly estimated with the whole        set and then with the two dummies 
                                                 
173 See Czarnitzky (2011) and Sterzi (2013).  
174 See Hall et al. (2001). 
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           and                       patents. For all of the dependent 
variables, we use a similar empirical setting. First, we analyse the influence of       , 
           and                       on our dependent variables. Subsequently 
we repeat the same analysis introducing a set of standard controls. In fact, a number of other 
variables are usually associated with patent citations count and characteristics.  
   
First of all, patents with more backward citations,        , are expected to receive more 
forward citations, since they often belong to more “crowded” technological areas. Second, 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a) found the number of claims, (        in our analysis) 
to be positively correlated with the number of forward citations.175 Trajtenberg (2002 [1990]) 
also postulated a positive relation between patent quality and the number of non-patent 
literature citations, an indicator of the invention’s scientific value. To this purpose,         
measures the share of non-patent literature over the total number of backward citations. 
 
 
          
        
                 
 
 
Together with patents’ intrinsic features, inventors’ and assignees’ characteristics may also 
influence the expected number of backward and forward citations. Reitzig (2004) and Alnuami 
et al. (2012) hypothesized that larger inventive teams (              ) may pull the 
number of citations up. Czarnitzky (2011) suggested that an equally positive effect may come 
from the geographical dispersion of inventive teams (measured there through an Herfindahl 
Index,              ).176 A similar rationale lies behind the inclusion of the assignees’ 
number,             , among our control variables. Sterzi (2013), finally, suggested to 
consider assignee’s experience, measured as the cumulate number of patents obtained by each 
assignee until the year preceding the focal patent’s application. Assignees with larger patent 
experience may naturally produce higher quality inventions and thus accumulate more 
citations. In particular, for each patent   granted at the time   (from 1960 through 2006), we 
define:177 
 
                                                 
175 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a). 
176 In particular we have                  
              
              
 
 
  . 
177 The baseline is set at 1960, the starting year of the NBER dataset. 
69 
 
                      
   
    
 
 
Table 6 displays our main variables, with a short description. Alongside our dependent 
variables,      ,            and            , our controls are clustered in 
patent’s, assignees’ and inventors’ characteristics.  
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Table 6: Variables’ description 
 
 
Variable Description
Ownership
public Dummy = 1 if the patent is owned by at least one academic institution or one public non-academic institution
university Dummy = 1 if the patent is owned by at least one academic institution
public (non university) Dummy = 1 if the patent is owned by at least one public non-academic institution
Dependent variables
ncited Number of forward citations received by a patent
general Patent Generality
orig Patent Originality
Patent characteristics
nciting Number of backward citations made by a patent
science Number of non-patent citations as a share of total backward citations
nclaims Number of claims in the patent application
Assignees' characteristics
experience Number of patents applied for till the year before the focal patent by the assignee
num_assignee Number of assignees
Inventors' characteristics
inventive_team Number of inventors' team components
HHI_inventors Herfindahl Index for inventors' geographical dispersion 
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5. Results 
 
“Experience is simply the name we give our mistakes” 
O. Wilde, 1892 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
We begin our analysis by comparing the characteristics of our two datasets, “Alfred” - our 
dataset, where we expect the public hand to be more visible - and “Adam” - the dataset 
provided by Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011). 
 
Figures 16 and 17 show the geographical origin of “Alfred” patents, together with their 
application dates’ distribution over time.  
 
Figure 16: Patent applications by year, Dataset “Alfred” 
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Figure 17: Patent assignees geographical breakdown, Dataset “Alfred” 
 
 
Most of the patents in our dataset were applied for between 1975 and 2005, with a peak in 
1995. The majority (sixty-six percent) of our patents were assigned to U.S. organizations or 
individuals. This figure is consistent with the “home bias” hypothesis, suggesting that 
companies would tend to patent their inventions mainly in their home country: non-U.S. 
inventions may thus be underrepresented in the USPTO patent database. Among the 
assignees, eighty-six percent were private corporations, seven percent were universities and the 
remaining seven percent, other public organizations (such as institutes, governmental bodies, 
public research centres or institutes).  
 
Figure 18: Patent ownership breakdown, Dataset “Alfred” 
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As anticipated, Cross-Reference Art Collections also provide an indication of inventions’ 
therapeutic target. This information offers some interesting insights. Table 7 shows that public 
and academic research tends to be concentrated on some specific areas. Forty-four percent of 
all patented biopharmaceuticals targeting cystic fibrosis were assigned to public bodies or 
universities. Similarly, thirty-five percent and thirty-four percent of all innovations in the fields 
of malaria and leukaemia were the result of government’s investments. On the other hand, 
almost ninety-four percent of total patents granted in the field of cosmetics, hair treatments 
and dermatitis were privately originated.178 An impressionistic “division of labor” between 
publicly funded research – following riskier and less profitable research paths - and private 
research – targeting profitable market shares with lower complexity – seems to emerge.  
 
Table 7: Academic, private and other public share of patents by therapeutic area 
 
 
Moving to our second dataset, “Adam”, we find a similar geographic and chronological patent 
distribution (see Figures 19 and 20). Sixty-one percent of the sample was composed by patents 
assigned to U.S. organizations or individuals. As for the application date, the distribution 
seems to have more variability than in “Alfred”. This may be due both to the considerably 
lower number of patents included (1,043 vs. 15,152) and to the nature of the underlying 
innovation. In fact, all patents included in the dataset refer to NMEs, that may be assimilated 
to scientific “breakthroughs”. The 1995-96 peak of patent application is coherent with the 
peak in the number of NMEs approved by the FDA in those years. 
 
                                                 
178 The set “Cosmetics, Dermatitis and Hair” includes the following subclasses: hair treatment, shampoo, 
dermatitis, athlete’s foot, acne, cellulites, eczema, poison (ivy, oak, sumac), psoriasis, seborrhoea, diaper rash, 
liquid make-up, cleansing cream or lotion, facial moisturizer, facial astringent. 
Private University
Public               
(non university)
Cystic Fibrosis 56% 29% 15%
Leukemia 65% 11% 24%
Malaria 68% 11% 21%
Cholera 71% 18% 12%
Muscolar Dystrophy 72% 8% 20%
Tuberculosis 72% 16% 12%
Multiple Sclerosis 72% 17% 10%
Hepatitis 74% 14% 12%
Diabetes 83% 11% 6%
Cosmetics, Hair and Dermatitis 94% 3% 3%
Source: USPTO, NBER Patent Database
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Figure 19: Patent applications by year, Dataset “Adam” 
 
 
Figure 20: Patent assignees geographical breakdown, Dataset “Adam” 
 
As for the composition of patent assignees, “Adam” shows a similar relative share of public 
and non-public organizations. Among the formers, however, academic patents amount to less 
than half of the total.  
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Figure 21: Patent ownership breakdown, Dataset “Adam” 
 
 
Source: Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011), USPTO and NBER 
 
Using Sampat and Lichtenberg’s (2011) variables, Table 8 shows the relative shares of 
academic, other public and private patents depending on underlying NMEs’ characteristics. 
Priority NMEs are those that obtain a “fast track” review from the FDA in reason of their 
potential effectiveness in addressing unmet medical needs or in improving substantially 
current treatments for a certain disease. Orphan drugs are those that target diseases affecting 
no more than 200,000 patients in the U.S. every year: for these drugs, that are likely to be 
neglected by private research because of their narrow market share, the government provides 
tax incentives and a longer exclusivity period. Expectedly, the public hand is more visible in 
the most innovative or neglected areas of biopharmaceutical research: thirty-four percent of 
patents associated with orphan drugs and thirty percent of those treating HIV were directly or 
indirectly funded by the U.S. federal government. Ninety-one percent of all standard review 
drugs, on the contrary, did not show any evidence of federal support.  
 
Table 8: Academic, private and other public share of patents by drug characteristics 
 
Private
86%
University
4%
Public                    
(non university)
10%
Private University
Public               
(non university)
Orphan drugs 65% 9% 26%
HIV 70% 12% 18%
Priority review drugs 83% 5% 12%
Other drugs 91% 2% 7%
Source: adapted from Sampat & Lichtenberg (2011)
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Table 9 shows some general comparative descriptive statistics for our two datasets. 
 
Table 9: Comparative descriptive statistics - Dataset “Alfred” vs. Dataset “Adam” 
 
 
Patents included in “Adam” look, overall, of higher quality. Not only they show a substantially 
higher average number or forward citations (17,5 vs. 7,4 in “Alfred”), but they also have more 
claims and larger inventive teams. Furthermore, assignees’ experience is extremely higher for 
“Adam” compared to “Alfred”: on average, an “Alfred” assignee had obtained 414 patents by 
the year of his new patent application, against the 7,418 patents of the average “Adam” 
assignee. These results are consistent with the abovementioned divergences in the two 
datasets building processes. By focusing on final products (the approved NMEs), Sampat and 
Lichtenberg (2011) collected a relatively homogeneous sample, with expectedly highly valuable 
and maybe more downstream patents (since they are associated with the discovery of new 
molecules). In fact, “Adam” has a slightly lower average number of non-patent citations (our 
indicator of scientific value) vis-à-vis “Alfred”. Furthermore, the exceptional patentee 
experience suggests that most of the patents included in the “Adam” dataset come from large 
pharmaceutical corporations. As suggested by Block (2011), Big Pharma’s role in current 
biopharmaceutical innovation systems is usually concentrated at the bottom of the innovation 
chain: they typically acquire new molecules from small biotech companies and academic spin-
offs in order to produce and market them on a large scale.  
5.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
Figures 22, 23 and 24 show the Kernel density functions for our dependent variables, 
      ,            and            , distinguished by assignee’s class. “Alfred” 
data are represented on the left side, while “Adam’s” on the right column. 
Dataset "Alfred" Dataset "Adam"
N. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 14469 7,3647 12,4828 0 322 1028 17,4309 31,6378 0 473
nciting 14469 5,7239 10,4939 0 369 1028 8,3648 19,9680 0 260
science 13418 0,4666 0,3678 0 1 1043 0,4633 0,3603 0 1
general 9667 0,4730 0,3230 0 1 799 0,4952 0,2676 0 1
orig 9316 0,4957 0,3455 0 1 770 0,5404 0,3182 0 1
nclaims 15152 13,9735 13,6276 1 683 1043 18,9041 21,3303 1 240
experience 15152 414,3142 961,1375 0 16.672 1043 7.418,4530 40.393,8800 0 349.471
num_assignee 15152 1,0992 0,4685 0 16 1043 1,0709 0,4024 1 9
inventive_team 15152 2,5928 1,7567 1 19 1043 3,3500 2,1286 1 15
HHI_inventors 15152 0,9740 0,1060 0,25 1 1043 0,9605 0,1288 0,28 1
Note: Descriptive statistics for our dataset (dataset "Alfred") and the one by Sampat & Lichtenberg (2011) (dataset "Adam").
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Figure 22: Kernel density for the number of forward citations - “Alfred” (left) and “Adam” (right) 
 
 
Figure 23: Kernel density for generality - “Alfred” (left) and “Adam” (right) 
  
 
Figure 24: Kernel density for originality - “Alfred” (left) and “Adam” (right) 
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The forward citations’ distribution shows the expected highly skewed shape, with no 
substantial differences among different assignee types. However, differently from the evidence 
reported by the main literature in the area, the distribution does not seem to be excessively 
zero-inflated. In fact, only fourteen percent of “Adam” patents (vs. fifteen percent of patents 
having either one or two citations) and eighteen percent of “Alfred” patents (vs. twenty-five 
percent having either one or two citations) had zero citations. This is coherent with the 
findings of Hall et al. (2001), who reported Drugs and Medical patents to receive significantly 
more citations compared to other technological classes. Furthermore, “Adam” university 
patents’ forward citations distribution looks significantly different from private and other 
public patents’, and suggests overall a better performance of academic patents in terms of 
citations. Differently from “Alfred”, finally, “Adam” distribution is characterised by a longer 
right tail, representing the extremely high number of citations received by a very small number 
of private patents.  
 
As for the            and             measures, the density functions show a 
generally coherent cross-assignee-class trend, with private patents performing relatively worse 
– in terms of our indicators - than their public counterparts. Furthermore, in both datasets, 
university patents seem to be on average more general and original.  
 
In order to test these intuitions, Tables 10 and 11 reports the detailed descriptive statistics of 
patents belonging to both datasets, distinguished by assignee class. In order to test for the 
difference among the distributions, we conduct both t-tests on mean difference and Mann-
Whitney test on median difference, which may take into account the forward citations’ 
distribution skewedness. In particular, we first compare non-public and public (including 
academic) patents in order to assess if the different research goals have any impact on 
innovation characteristics; subsequently, in order to capture the specific features of university 
and public institutions’ R&D, we break down public patents in academic and non-academic 
ones, and separately compare them with privately originated patents.
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 Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables - Dataset “Alfred” 
 
 
 
 
Dataset "Alfred"
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mann-Whitney 
test on median 
difference
Non Public Patents Univeristy and Other Public Patents
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 7,6703 12,3545 0 193 -0,3549 (0,9865)
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,4983 0,3168 0 1 -0,0292 *** (0,0016) ***
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5192 0,3352 0 1 -0,0276 *** (0,0075) ***
Non Public Patents University Patents
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 8,5743 13,1768 0 193 -1,2589 *** (0,0006) ***
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,4922 0,3150 0 1 -0,0232 * (0,0764) *
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5174 0,3237 0 1 -0,0258 * (0,0700) *
Non Public Patents Public (non university) Patents
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 6,6266 11,2483 0 113 0,6889 (0,0002) ***
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,5062 0,3193 0 1 -0,0372 *** (0,0032) ***
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5214 0,3486 0 1 -0,0297 ** (0,0329) **
University Patents Public (non university) Patents
ncited 8,5743 13,1768 0 193 6,6266 11,2483 0 113 1,9477 *** (0,0000) ***
general 0,4922 0,3150 0 1 0,5062 0,3193 0 1 -0,0140 (0,2731)
orig 0,5174 0,3237 0 1 0,5214 0,3486 0 1 -0,0039 (0,6101)
t -test on mean 
difference
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables - Dataset “Adam” 
 
 
Dataset "Adam"
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mann-Whitney 
test on median 
difference
Non Public Patents Univeristy and Other Public Patents
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 15,6014 25,011 0 138 2,1252 (0,0037) ***
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,5883 0,233 0 1 -0,1045 *** (0,0003) ***
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,5799 0,3086 0 1 -0,0465 (0,1015)
Non Public Patents University Patents
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 25,0000 30,4536 0 138 -7,2734 (0,0492) **
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,5784 0,2190 0 0,9 -0,0946 * (0,0226) **
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,6410 0,3164 0 1 -0,1076 * (0,0399) **
Non Public Patents Public (non university) Patents
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 12,0769 21,7777 0 113 5,6496 (0,0000) ***
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,594 0,2425 0 1 -0,1103 *** (0,0030) ***
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,5595 0,3051 0 1 -0,0261 (0,4302)
University Patents Public (non university) Patents
ncited 25 30,4536 0 138 12,0769 21,7777 0 113 12,9231 *** (0,0005) ***
general 0,5784 0,219 0 1 0,594 0,2425 0 1 -0,0156 (0,9824)
orig 0,641 0,3164 0 1 0,5595 0,3051 0 1 0,0815 (0,0999)
t -test on mean 
difference
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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At first glance, public patents belonging to “Alfred” do not show any significant difference 
from private ones in the number of forward citations, although being on average more general 
and original. When considering separately academic and non-academic inventions, however, a 
different scenario emerges. Looking at the t-test coefficients, university inventions receive on 
average 1,3 more citations than private ones, while other public patents receive 0,7 citations 
less. If confirmed by regression analyses, this evidence may suggest that the most valuable 
innovations are actually generated in universities, followed by private corporations and, at last, 
by public institutes and research centres (see Table 7???). This explanation would also be 
consistent with the biotechnological innovation system described in Chapter 3, where 
universities work as focal points. As for our second set of dependent variables, public patents 
(both academic and non-academic) show significantly higher scores with respect to both 
generality and originality. Interestingly, also the number of claims and of non-patent literature 
citations, both used as proxies of patent value, appear to be higher for public innovations. 
Again, however, academic patents show a significantly better performance than other public 
but non academic ones.  
 
Moving to “Adam”, we notice that – differently from the case of “Alfred” - t-tests and Mann-
Whitney tests deliver different results in terms of significance. In fact, the Mann-Whitney test 
on medians’ difference suggests that the three distributions are significantly different, while 
the t-test does not highlight any divergence among academic, other public and private patents. 
Because of the high skewedness of the distribution, the median test should be more reliable. 
We would thus expect our regressions to find a significant positive relation between the 
academic status of a patent and its expected number of citations, and a negative one between 
the public (non-academic status) and the same number of citations. As for            
and            , “Adam” public patents look more general but not more original than 
their private counterparts. This may be linked to the breakthrough nature of the underlying 
inventions, which may increase their influence on future research without necessarily implying 
their reliance upon a broad set of technical knowledge. The effect of other control variables is 
ambiguous. Tables 12 and 13 show the correlation matrices for our key variables. Of course, 
the simple correlations do not provide substantial information, since the number of citations 
received by patents granted in different years is not comparable. Some control and explanatory 
variables are slightly correlated. This suggests that multicollinearity issues may be relatively 
unlikely to distort the regressions’ result.179
                                                 
179 See also Singh (2008). 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix - Dataset “Alfred” 
 
 
 
Table 13: Correlation Matrix - Dataset “Adam” 
 
 
Dataset "Alfred" (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) non public 1
(2) university -0,7034* 1
(3) public (non university) -0,6569* -0,0739* 1
(4) ncited -0,0098 0,0275* -0,0155 1
(5) nciting -0,0130 0,0197* -0,0027 0,0131 1
(6) science -0,1958* 0,1679* 0,0955* -0,0173* -0,1733* 1
(7) general -0,0310* 0,0172 0,0257* 0,0406* -0,0031 -0,0069 1
(8) orig -0,0284* 0,0186 0,02 0,0004 0,0532* 0,0222* 0,1626* 1
(9) nclaims -0,0271* 0,0333* 0,0027 0,0747* 0,1727* -0,0176* 0,0323* 0.0374* 1
(10) experience 0,0357* -0,0322* -0,0159 -0,0202* 0,0427* -0,0756* -0,0036 0.0350* 0.0248* 1
(11) num_assignee -0,0661* 0,0680* 0,0206* 0,001 -0,0004 0,0366* -0,0033 -0.0158 -0.0022 -0.0637* 1
(12) inventive_team -0,0077 -0,0145 0,0262* -0,0373* 0,0016 0,0013 0,0269* 0.0640* 0.0388* 0.0785* 0.1642* 1
(13) HHI_inventors 0,0313* -0,0362* -0,0056 0,0236* -0,0432* -0,0339* -0,0088 -0.0201 -0.0193* -0.0295* -0.0767* -0.1657* 1
Note: Pairwise correlation matrix. * level of significance (probability thresholds): <5%.
Dataset "Adam" (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) non public 1
(2) university -0.5014* 1
(3) public (non university) -0.8293* -0.0677* 1
(4) ncited 0,0233 0,0475 -0.0568 1
(5) nciting -0.0935* -0.0052 0.1106* -0.0637* 1
(6) science -0.1080* 0.0765* 0.0751* 0.0054 -0.0970* 1
(7) general -0.1217* 0,0636 0.1005* 0.0934* 0,0181 -0.0338 1
(8) orig -0.0523 0,0626 0,0215 0,0209 0.0711* 0.0771* 0.1315* 1
(9) nclaims -0.0161 -0.0512 0,0516 0.1017* 0.2399* 0,0198 0,0394 0,0139 1
(10) experience 0,0338 -0.0364 -0.0155 0,0134 0,0278 0,0132 0,0537 -0.0294 0.1408* 1
(11) num_assignee -0.0868* 0.1115* 0,0281 0.0654* 0,0398 0,0299 -0.0047 0.0067 0.1373* 0.4532* 1
(12) inventive_team 0,0391 -0.0310 -0.0251 -0.0536 -0.0213 0.0074 0.0707* 0,0390 0,0420 -0.0869* 0.1166* 1
(13) HHI_inventors 0,0244 -0.0315 -0.0078 0.0078 0,049 -0.0713* -0.0539 0.0930* 0.0077 0,0116 -0.1404* -0.1877* 1
Note: Pairwise correlation matrix. * level of significance (probability thresholds): <5%.
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5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
In order to strengthen the results of our univariate analysis, we move to a multivariate analysis. 
As anticipated, the nature of        distribution requires a count regression model. 
Performing the Cameron & Trivedi test for overdispersion, we find that forward citations in 
both “Alfred” and “Adam” are significantly overdispersed.180 Standard Poisson regression is 
thus expected to considerably underestimate standard errors. In order to overcome this issue, 
we follow Czarnitzky (2011) and perform a Poisson Quasi-maximum Likelihood regression, 
i.e. a Poisson regression with fully robust standard errors.  
 
In order to obtain more readily analysable data, starting from each coefficient regression, we 
compute the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR). Borrowed from epidemiology, IRRs show the 
change in incidence rate for a one-unit change in any given variable, ceteris paribus. In our case, 
IRRs highlight the change in forward citations incidence when moving from private to public 
and academic patents.  
 
Table 14 reports the results of our robust standard error Poisson regressions for our “Alfred” 
and “Adam” datasets: Models (I) and (III) report the results of a simple regression of 
       on       , the dummy = 1 if the assignee is non-private. Models (II) and (IV) 
extend the analysis by including our set of control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 See Cameron and Trivedi (2010), p. 575. 
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Table 14: Poisson QMLE with fully robust standard error, by public 
 
 
Dataset "Alfred" Dataset "Adam"
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Ownership
public 1,0860** 1,1054*** 1,1646 1,0857
(0,0408) (0,0408) (0,1983) (0,1865)
Patent characteristics
nciting 1,0114*** 0,9982
(0,0017) (0,0028)
science 0,9401 1,2099*
(0,0488) (0,1262)
nclaims 1,0070*** 1,0095***
(0,0014) (0,0016)
Assignees' characteristics
experience 1,0000 1,0000
(0,0000) (0,0000)
num_assignee 1,0024 1,2476
(0,0248) (0,2733)
Inventors' characteristics
inventive_team 0,9722*** 0,9917
(0,0098) (0,0193)
HHI_inventors 1,1579 0,9696
(0,1664) (0,3561)
Statistics
Number of observations 14451 13401 1024 1024
Log-likelihood -89009,2550 -81048,3610 -11413,80 -10795,104
Note: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regression with fully robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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Table 15: Poisson QMLE with fully robust standard error, by university and public (non university) 
 
Dataset "Alfred" Dataset "Adam"
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Ownership
university 1,1413*** 1,1550*** 1,3584 1,3249
(0,0568) (0,0526) (0,1994) (0,2483)
public (non university) 1,0134 1,0397 1,0490 0,9530
(0,0505) (0,0526) (0,2750) (0,1862)
Patent characteristics
nciting 1,0114*** 0,9982
(0,0017) (0,0028)
science 0,9385 1,2069*
(0,0485) (0,1248)
nclaims 1,0070*** 1,0096***
(0,0014) (0,0016)
Assignees' characteristics
experience 1,0000 1,0000
(0,0000) (0,0000)
num_assignee 1,0025 1,2478
(0,0250) (0,2708)
Inventors' characteristics
inventive_team 0,9725*** 0,9938
(0,0097) (0,0191)
HHI_inventors 1,1593 0,9601
(0,1672) (0,3457)
Statistics
Number of observations 14451 13401 1024 1024
Log-likelihood -88982,9890 -81028,4210 -11396,55 -10767,408
Note: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regression with fully robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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As for “Alfred”, the Poisson regression shows a positive correlation between the number of 
forward citations and the public nature of a patent assignee. In particular, public status 
increases by a factor of 1.09 the predicted count of citations. The relationship holds even 
when we add our set of control variables. While the control variables included are not our 
central focus, it is worth pointing out that, consistently with our expectation based on 
previous literature, the number of claims and of backward citations are also significantly 
correlated with the expected number of forward citations. However, public status determines 
the highest IRR, suggesting the greater relevance of our explanatory variable on the predicted 
number of citations vis-à-vis other control variables.  
 
If we break our set of public patents in academic and non-academic, however, coherently with 
the preliminary results of the Mann-Whitney tests, the scenario becomes more complex (see 
Table 15). In fact, while university patents still show significantly higher count of forward 
citations, other public patents do not seem to differ from private ones in the expected number 
of forward citations. In other words, while university patents stand out for their higher 
number of forward citations, patents assigned to governments, public research institutes and 
research hospitals do not seem to be significantly more cited than private patents.  
 
Moving to “Adam”, we find no statistically significant relationship between assignee’s status 
and the expected number of citations. The Mann-Whitney test, however, indicated that 
citations’ distributions differed significantly depending on the owner’s nature. A possible 
explanation of this apparent inconsistency may lie in “Adam” forward citations’ distribution 
shape. In fact, as the right tail of the private patents citations’ distribution is very long, a 
number of outlier observations may distort the median test’s results. In order to test this 
intuition, we conduct a robust OLS regression over the observations belonging to the top 1% 
of the distribution, those at the end of the tail. As predicted, the regression highlights a 
significant positive relationship between private status and the expected number of citations 
for our outliers. On the contrary, when we extended the analysis to the whole sample, the 
relationship lost all its statistical significance. This result suggests that the divergence between 
the Mann-Whitney and the t-tests is not due to a better fitness of the median-based test, but to 
the distorting effect of the citations’ distribution outliers. The only significant variable 
highlighted by the regression is thus the number of claims, which slightly increases (by a factor 
of 1.01) the predicted count of forward citations.    
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Table 16: Fractional Logit with fully robust standard errors for Generality and Originality, by public 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dataset "Alfred" Dataset "Adam"
Generality Originality Generality Originality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Ownership
public 0,1469*** 0,1747*** 0,1051*** 0,1018** 0,3881*** 0,4460*** 0,1180 0,0979
(0,0383) (0,0403) (0,0396) (0,0415) (0,1116) (0,1119) (0,1450) (0,1496)
Patent characteristics
nciting 0,0024 0,0067*** 0,0018 0,0043**
(0,0016) (0,0015) (0,0022) (0,0019)
science -0,0897*** 0,0871* -0,0735 0,2899**
(0,0401) (0,0529) (0,1052) (0,1687)
nclaims 0,0038*** 0,0028** 0,0022 -0,0005
(0,0012) (0,0013) (0,0016) (0,0017)
Assignees' characteristics
experience 0,0001 0,0001*** 0,0001*** 0,0001
(0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001)
num_assignee -0,0211 -0,0880*** -0,2273*** 0,0897
(0,0338) (0,0337) (0,0884) (0,1446)
Inventors' characteristics
inventive_team 0,0182*** 0,0504*** 0,0624*** 0,0353**
(0,0086) (0,0088) (0,0189) (0,0201)
HHI_inventors -0,1285 -0,0919 -0,5209 1,1990***
(0,1397) (0,1255) (0,3501) (0,4048)
Statistics
cons 10,3827 1,0815*** -0,6931*** -0,7408*** -0,2430 0,4101 -13,9615*** -14,4232***
(3,4179) (0,3184) (1,2248) (1,2568) (0,0001) (0,3617) (1,0646) (1,0975)
Number of observations 9667 8839 9316 9316 799 799 770 770
Log-pseudolikelihood -5306,6401 -4846,3008 -5264,9571 -5242,3923 -406,7429 -403,6994 -413,7826 -410,1856
Year dummies included included included included included included included included
Note: Fractional logit regressions with robust standard erros (in parentheses); *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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Table 17: Fractional Logit with fully robust standard errors for Generality and Originality, by university and public (non university) 
 
 
Dataset "Alfred" Dataset "Adam"
Generality Originality Generality Originality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Ownership
university 0,1288*** 0,1638*** 0,0960** 0,0886* 0,3050* 0,4038** 0,4083 0,3612
(0,0491) (0,0506) (0,0502) (0,0521) (0,1716) (0,1736) (0,2507) (0,2633)
public (non university) 0,1704*** 0,1889*** 0,1158** 0,1170** 0,4366*** 0,4702*** -0,0008 -0,0074
(0,0556) (0,0582) (0,0581) (0,0590) (0,1401) (0,1397) (0,1712) (0,1729)
Patent characteristics
nciting 0,0024 0,0067*** 0,0018 0,0043*
(0,0016) (0,0015) (0,0022) (0,0019)
science -0,0893** 0,0881* -0,0728 0,2787*
(0,0401) (0,0530) (0,1050) (0,0019)
nclaims 0,0038*** 0,0028** 0,0022 -0,0004
(0,0012) (0,0013) (0,0016) (0,0017)
Assignees' characteristics
experience 0,0001 0,0001*** 0,0001*** 0,0001
(0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001)
num_assignee -0,0210 -0,0875*** -0,2260** 0,0805
(0,0338) (0,0337) (0,0885) (0,1453)
Inventors' characteristics
inventive_team 0,0181** 0,0503*** 0,0623*** 0,0356*
(0,0086) (0,0088) (0,0189) (0,0201)
HHI_inventors -0,1290 -0,0929 -0,5213 1,1869***
(0,1397) (0,1256) (0,3496) (0,4019)
Statistics
cons 14,2113*** 1,0814*** -0,6931*** -0,7406*** -0,2430*** 0,4098 -13,9615*** -14,3997***
(5,1588) (0,3186) (1,2248) (1,2570) (0,0000) (0,3611) (0,9810) (1,0907)
Number of observations 9667 8839 9316 9316 799 799 770 770
Log-pseudolikelihood -5306,5708 -4846,2764 -5264,9405 -5242,3586 -406,7022 -403,6892 -413,3954 -409,8767
Year dummies included included included included included included included included
Note: Fractional logit regressions with robust standard erros (in parentheses); *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
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The second part of our analysis focuses on            and            . Fractional 
logit analysis results are reported in Tables 16 and 17.  
 
In both datasets, public patents are significantly more general than private ones. In “Alfred”, 
public patents – both considered as a whole and split in academic and non-academic – were 
also significantly more original. This evidence is also conceptually supported by the 
significantly positive relationship between the share of non-patent citations (the scientific 
content of our patent), the number of claims (another indicator of patent breadth) and the 
level of generality and originality. Among the control variables, it is also interesting to notice 
how larger inventive teams produce on average more original and general patents. In fact, a 
higher number of inventors may signal that the final invention is more complex, since it relies 
on a broader set of skills. As for originality, however, public patents included in “Adam” – 
both academic and non-academic - do not appear to be significantly different from privates. 
This finding confirms the descriptive analysis’ results and is consistent with the fact that 
“Adam” patents are associated to biopharmaceutical breakthroughs (NMEs): their influence 
on future research is thus likely to exceed the influence of previous research on themselves. In 
fact, the relative number of forward citations is much higher for patents belonging to “Adam” 
(see Table 18).  
 
Table 18: Ncited/Nciting ratios, broken down by ownership 
 
 
The divergence in the citations’ structure may be linked to the greater innovativeness of 
“Adam” discoveries, as well as to their downstream nature. Looked at from this angle, this 
evidence may indicate a division of labour between public and private research: on the one 
hand, public and academic institutions would produce basic biopharmaceutical knowledge in a 
slow cumulative process – coincident with our “Alfred” patents; on the other hand, a more 
serendipitous research stream may in-form previously accumulated knowledge and produce 
breakthrough drugs, as highlighted by “Adam” patents. Although fascinating, however, this 
hypothesis would need a far more detailed microscopic comparative analysis in order to be 
tested. 
 
 
NCITED/NCITING Ratio Non Public Patents
Univeristy and Other 
Public Patents Univeristy Patents
Public (non university) 
Patents
Dataset "Alfred" 1,29 1,26 1,33 1,18
Dataset "Adam" 2,33 1,20 3,19 0,81
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6. Conclusions 
 
“I love to travel, but I hate to arrive.” 
A. Einstein 
 
 
Our goal in this work was to shed some light on the nature and the characteristics of public 
contribution to biopharmaceutical innovation. In fact, although being often agnostically 
recognised, the role of government has been seldom analysed in detail. We argue that this fact 
had a twofold justification. Theoretically, the dominant economic paradigm has confined the 
government to the role of a “stopgap”: the public would be allowed to intervene only when 
markets fail to produce the optimal amount of knowledge. Empirically, the complexity of 
economic and legal relationships linking all actors involved in the innovation chain has often 
made the measurement of government financial and strategic intervention a quixotic 
enterprise.  
 
As for the theoretical point, we reviewed the main pillars of the evolutionary approach to 
technical change. Thanks to its focus on dynamism and its acknowledgement of innovation 
processes’ cumulativeness and irregularity, evolutionary economics provides a far more 
realistic and robust departure point for effective innovation policies’ design. From an 
evolutionary perspective, the validity of current institutional devices aiming at incentivizing 
innovation seems to vacillate. Similarly, historical accounts reported in this work suggest that 
IPRs – the “gold standard” of innovation policies in the last two centuries – have often been 
ineffective or even detrimental in promoting technical change. David (2003) had suggested 
that patents work as pandas’ thumbs: they would be imperfect but functional. In the light of 
current “innovation systems”, however, patents – whose rationale lies upon the blackboard 
theory of market failure - are quite unlikely to be useful. On the contrary, we expect the (real) 
patent systems’ social costs to overcome by far its (alleged) benefits. 
 
With regard to the biopharmaceutical industry, the abovementioned debate acquires an even 
greater value. Because of its peculiar features and its immediate link with human life (and 
death), biopharmaceutical innovation has been often regarded as the emblem of the great 
potential of technical change and, simultaneously, of current innovation policies’ 
dysfunctionalities. In fact, according to Angell (2004), Block (2011), Sampat and Lichtenberg 
(2011) and Mazzucato (2013), the public hand would be extremely active in financing 
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pharmaceutical R&D; however, because of the peculiar structure of biopharmaceutical 
innovation, composed of a dense network of formal and informal relationship between public, 
academic and private actors, large multinational corporations would finally appropriate most 
publicly-originated innovations. Although being fundamental in promoting basic and applied 
research that ultimately generate new pharmaceutical products, the public hand would thus 
ultimately shade away. In turn, this would prevent large shares of global population from 
gaining access to life-saving drugs.  
 
In order to elude the impasse linked to the public hand invisibility, we develop a patent analysis, 
aimed at identifying the value and the characteristics of public and private biopharmaceutical 
innovation as resulting from patent citations’ count and structure. In order to do so, we use 
two datasets: the first one (“Alfred”) collects 15,152 patents granted between 1976 and 2006 
belonging to the USPTO classes 514.810-935; the second one (“Adam”), borrowed from 
Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011), includes 1,043 patents associated with all the NMEs 
approved by the FDA between 1988 and 2005. By comparing “Alfred” patents with at least 
one public or academic inventor to those originated by private corporations, we find that 
public and academic patents result in greater knowledge externalities as measured by forward 
citations. Furthermore, public and academic patents are on average more original and more 
general. However, when repeating the same analysis on “Adam” – which is supposed to 
include downstream patents, mainly associated with major breakthrough innovations - no 
statically significant difference emerges between public and non public patents in terms of 
forward citations and generality.  
 
Of course, this result may be driven by the fact that, moving downwards along the 
biopharmaceutical innovation chain, publicly-funded innovations tend to be appropriated by 
Big Pharma. This view is supported by the recent work of Vallas et al. (2011). A different 
interpretation, however, may suggest that a division of labour between public and private 
actors is in place, with the former focusing on incremental, cumulative research and the latter 
synthesising previous knowledge in new marketable drugs.  
 
In both cases, our analysis demonstrates the complexity of any investigation around public 
and private roles in technical change. Beyond the public-private ideological dichotomy, the 
forces behind biopharmaceutical innovation seem to be hard to catch. In between the visible 
hand of Big Pharma and the invisible hand of market competition, the presence of a third 
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hand, the government’s one, is certainly perceivable. However, at first glance, the public hand 
seems ethereal, visible and invisible at the same time. Therefore, we argue that in order to 
deliver a more substantial set of empirical evidence, future research should adopt a microscopic 
approach, exploring the characteristics of public and private R&D over different therapeutic 
areas and at different levels of the innovation chain. Only in this way, public policy will be able 
to design effective institutional mechanisms in order to maximize the synergies between public 
and private hands: their “handshake” will probably generate substantial and accessible 
innovative products for all.  
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Appendix  
A. 1 Dataset “Alfred” Detailed Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non Public Patents Univeristy and Other Public Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 7,6703 12,3545 0 193 -0,3549 0,9865
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,4983 0,3168 0 1 -0,0292 *** 0,0016 ***
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5192 0,3352 0 1 -0,0276 *** 0,0075 ***
nciting 5,6690 10,6338 0 369 6,0647 9,5755 0 107 -0,3958 0,0000 ***
science 0,4369 0,3674 0 1 0,6408 0,3187 0 1 -0,2039 *** 0,0000 ***
nclaims 13,8258 13,7581 1 683 14,8971 12,7458 1 115 -1,0712 *** 0,0000 ***
experience 428,0295 987,5240 0 16672 328,5495 770,7346 0 6.965 99,4799 *** 0,0000 ***
num_assignee 1,0868 0,4661 1 16 1,1766 0,4764 0 5 -0,0898 *** 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 2,5874 1,7545 1 19 2,6266 1,7702 1 18 -0,0392 0,0384 **
HHI_inventors 0,9753 0,1033 0 1 0,9657 0,1209 0 1 0,0096 *** 0,0001 ***
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
t -test on mean 
difference
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
Non Public Patents Univeristy Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 8,5743 13,1768 0 193 -1,2589 *** 0,0006 ***
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,4922 0,3150 0 1 -0,0232 * 0,0764 *
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5174 0,3237 0 1 -0,0258 * 0,0700 *
nciting 5,6690 10,6338 0 369 6,4545 9,6025 0 102 -0,7855 ** 0,0000 ***
science 0,4369 0,3674 0 1 0,6778 0,2996 0 1 -0,2410 *** 0,0000 ***
nclaims 13,8258 13,7581 1 683 15,5851 13,5208 1 115 -1,7592 * 0,0000 ***
experience 428,0295 987,5240 0 16672 304,2880 636,7659 0 5.830 123,7414 * 0,0000 ***
num_assignee 1,0868 0,4661 1 16 1,2124 0,4531 1 3 -0,1256 * 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 2,5874 1,7545 1 19 2,5023 1,6057 1 14 0,0851 0,8235
HHI_inventors 0,9753 0,1033 0 1 0,9604 0,1300 0 1 0,0150 0,0000 ***
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
t -test on mean 
difference
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
Non Public Patents Public (non university) Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 7,3155 12,5031 0 322 6,6266 11,2483 0 113 0,6889 0,0002 ***
general 0,4690 0,3237 0 1 0,5062 0,3193 0 1 -0,0372 *** 0,0032 ***
orig 0,4916 0,3472 0 1 0,5214 0,3486 0 1 -0,0297 ** 0,0329 **
nciting 5,6690 10,6338 0 369 5,6148 9,5296 0 107 0,0542 0,0598 *
science 0,4369 0,3674 0 1 0,5974 0,3347 0 1 -0,1605 *** 0,0000 ***
nclaims 13,8258 13,7581 1 683 14,1155 11,7621 1 93 -0,2897 0,3087
experience 428,0295 987,5240 0 16672 356,1104 898,5840 0 6.965 71,9190 ** 0,8910
num_assignee 1,0868 0,4661 1 16 1,1360 0,4986 0 5 -0,0492 *** 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 2,5874 1,7545 1 19 2,7679 1,9313 1 18 -0,1805 *** 0,0007 ***
HHI_inventors 0,9753 0,1033 0 1 0,9718 0,1093 0 1 0,0036 0,2840
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
t -test on mean 
difference
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
University Patents Public (non university) Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 8,5743 13,1768 0 193 6,6266 11,2483 0 113 1,9477 *** 0,0000 ***
general 0,4922 0,3150 0 1 0,5062 0,3193 0 1 -0,0140 0,2731
orig 0,5174 0,3237 0 1 0,5214 0,3486 0 1 -0,0039 0,6101
nciting 6,4545 9,6025 0 102 5,6148 9,5296 0 107 0,8397 ** 0,0018 ***
science 0,6778 0,2996 0 1 0,5974 0,3347 0 1 0,0804 *** 0,0000 ***
nclaims 15,5851 13,5208 1 115 14,1155 11,7621 1 93 1,4695 *** 0,0071 ***
experience 304,2880 636,7659 0 5830 356,1104 898,5840 0 6.965 -51,8224 0,0000 ***
num_assignee 1,2124 0,4531 1 3 1,1360 0,4986 0 5 0,0764 *** 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 2,5023 1,6057 1 14 2,7679 1,9313 1 18 -0,2656 *** 0,0026 ***
HHI_inventors 0,9604 0,1300 0 1 0,9718 0,1093 0 1 -0,0114 ** 0,0308 **
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
t -test on mean 
difference
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
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A. 2 Dataset “Adam” Detailed Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non Public Patents Univeristy and Other Public Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 15,6014 25,0110 0 138 2,1252 0,0037 ***
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,5883 0,2330 0 1 -0,1045 *** 0,0003 ***
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,5799 0,3086 0 1 -0,0465 0,1015
nciting 7,6147 17,8178 0 260 13,0070 29,7007 0 250 -5,3923 *** 0,0015 ***
science 0,4476 0,3604 0 1 0,5597 0,3454 0 1 -0,1121 *** 0,0003 ***
nclaims 18,7659 21,0049 1 240 19,7534 23,2897 1 145 -0,9875 0,7556
experience 7969,7640 42152,2500 0 349471 4031,2950 27066,2500 0 268098 3938,4690 0,0063 ***
num_assignee 1,0569 0,3869 1 9 1,1575 0,4798 1 4 -0,1007 *** 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 3,3835 2,1820 1 15 3,1438 1,7577 1 10 0,2397 0,4772
HHI_inventors 0,9618 0,1272 0,3 1 0,9527 0,1388 0,4 1 0,0091 0,4033
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
t -test on mean 
difference
Non Public Patents Univeristy Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 25,0000 30,4536 0 138 -7,2734 0,0492 **
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,5784 0,2190 0 1 -0,0946 * 0,0226 **
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,6410 0,3164 0 1 -0,1076 * 0,0399 **
nciting 7,6147 17,8178 0 260 7,8462 9,4076 0 43 -0,2315 0,3660
science 0,4476 0,3604 0 1 0,5994 0,3525 0 1 -0,1519 *** 0,0095 ***
nclaims 18,7659 21,0049 1 240 13,5122 10,1270 1 40 5,2537 0,1299
experience 7969,7640 42152,2500 0 349471 149,5854 169,7541 4 672 7820,1780 0,0063 ***
num_assignee 1,0569 0,3869 1 9 1,2927 0,6018 1 3 -0,2358 *** 0,0000 ***
inventive_team 3,3835 2,1820 1 15 3,0244 1,7817 1 10 0,3591 0,3870
HHI_inventors 0,9618 0,1272 0,3 1 0,9404 0,1517 0,4 1 0,0213 0,2214
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
t -test on mean 
difference
Non Public Patents Public (non university) Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 17,7266 32,5846 0 473 12,0769 21,7777 0 113 5,6496 0,0000 ***
general 0,4838 0,2695 0 1 0,5940 0,2425 0 1 -0,1103 *** 0,0030 ***
orig 0,5334 0,3196 0 1 0,5595 0,3051 0 1 -0,0261 0,4302
nciting 7,6147 17,8178 0 260 14,9423 34,1998 0 250 -7,3276 *** 0,0012 ***
science 0,4476 0,3604 0 1 0,5441 0,3430 0 1 -0,0965 *** 0,0061 ***
nclaims 18,7659 21,0049 1 240 22,1905 26,3713 1 145 -3,4246 0,5884
experience 7969,7640 42152,2500 0 349471 5547,0100 31829,5100 0 268098 2422,7540 0,2002
num_assignee 1,0569 0,3869 1 9 1,1048 0,4143 1 4 -0,0479 0,0458 **
inventive_team 3,3835 2,1820 1 15 3,1905 1,7546 1 9 0,1930 0,7865
HHI_inventors 0,9618 0,1272 0,3 1 0,9575 0,1339 0,4 1 0,0043 0,7398
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
t -test on mean 
difference
University Patents Public (non university) Patents
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ncited 25,0000 30,4536 0 138 12,0769 21,7777 0 113 12,9231 *** 0,0005 ***
general 0,5784 0,2190 0 1 0,5940 0,2425 0 1 -0,0156 0,9824
orig 0,6410 0,3164 0 1 0,5595 0,3051 0 1 0,0815 0,0999
nciting 7,8462 9,4076 0 43 14,9423 34,1998 0 250 -7,0962 0,3096
science 0,5994 0,3525 0 1 0,5441 0,3430 0 1 0,0553 0,3819
nclaims 13,5122 10,1270 1 40 22,1905 26,3713 1 145 -8,6783 ** 0,1283
experience 149,5854 169,7541 4 672 55447,0100 31829,5100 0 268098 -5397,4240 0,1085
num_assignee 1,2927 0,6018 1 3 1,1048 0,4143 1 4 0,1879 ** 0,0153 **
inventive_team 3,0244 1,7817 1 10 3,1905 1,7546 1 9 -0,1661 0,4059
HHI_inventors 0,9404 0,1517 0,4 1 0,9575 0,1339 0,4 1 -0,0171 0,5917
Note: t -test on mean difference and Mann-Whitney test on median difference (p-values in partentheses).*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
t -test on mean 
difference
Mann-Whitney test 
on median difference
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